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of Civil Procedure
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Albert Einstein defined insanity as “doing the same thing over and over again, and
expecting different results.”1 For over thirty years, the federal rules of civil procedure have been
serially amended to require federal trial judges to control pretrial discovery in civil cases to
ensure that it is “proportional”—meaning that the costs to the parties are not unduly great given
what is at stake in the litigation. And, for thirty years, lawyers, bar associations, clients and
commentators have complained loudly that the federal judges have not done so. The Supreme
Court has approved yet another series of civil rules changes, which took effect on December 1,
2015, that once more direct judges to ensure that discovery is proportional. But if the
proportionality requirement already has been in the rules for over thirty years without inducing
judges to fulfill their obligation to manage discovery, what makes this latest amendment
requiring the exact same thing any more likely to achieve success? In short, why has achieving
proportionality been such an elusive goal? Is it possible for judges to manage discovery so that it
is proportional? If so, how are they to do so? And, if achieving proportionality is possible, why
have judges failed to do so? Is it because they are resistant to doing what the rules require? Or
are they willing to try, but they lack the knowledge or training to succeed in the task?
These questions, and their answers, are the focus of this thesis. Based on an analysis of
nearly two hundred cases in which federal judges had to resolve discovery disputes, decided
between 1983 (when the proportionality requirement first was adopted) and 2014, I conclude that
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judges can use a surprisingly large and flexible array of tools—alone or in combination—to
achieve proportional discovery. Further, I conclude that frequently recurring “warning signs”
signal when a case is likely to involve discovery issues that threaten to make proportionality
difficult to achieve, and these can alert judges to the need to take action before the discovery
costs spiral out of control or excessive delay in completing discovery occurs. Finally, based on a
survey of forty-two district judges and sixty-eight magistrate judges, I conclude that the most
likely reasons for the lack of success in achieving proportional discovery to date is a reluctance
on the part of judges to view themselves as “case managers” as opposed to “dispute resolvers,”
and a lack of sufficient training or education for judges to see the benefits and methods of
managing discovery to achieve proportionality. In essence, new federal judges traditionally must
“figure out for themselves” how to deal with discovery disputes in their cases. For those who
come to the bench with substantial prior experience as civil litigators, this may not be too much
to expect of them. But for those who come to the bench after a career as a prosecutor, defense
counsel, or non-litigator, the task of managing discovery in hundreds of civil cases, while
simultaneously handling an equivalent number of criminal cases, can be daunting. My ultimate
conclusion is that if the most recent changes to the civil rules are to have their intended result, a
judicial education program must accompany their enactment. The program would teach judges
the tools and techniques available to monitor and manage discovery in civil cases before
problems develop (rather than waiting until a discovery dispute has occurred to become
involved), and it would counteract the resistance of many judges to accept the obligation to do
so.
I start with a discussion of the criticisms expressed about the current state of things, as
reflected in a series of surveys conducted in 2009 by several prominent bar organizations,
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followed by a discussion of the civil procedure rules themselves, and the efforts over the last
thirty years to require judges to monitor and manage discovery to achieve proportionality. While
the obligation to do so is clear, the rules are nearly silent about how the judges are expected to
accomplish this vital task, and the bar surveys—though almost uniformly critical of the judges’
failures to do so—similarly offer no helpful insight as to the techniques or procedures they
should use to succeed. Then, based upon an analysis of nearly two hundred cases decided in the
last thirty years where the parties asked judges to resolve discrete discovery disputes in pending
federal cases, I identify a “toolkit” of techniques that a judge can employ—alone, or in
combination—to achieve proportionality.
Using examples from the cases, I discuss these techniques, which include such measures
as actively monitoring all cases and becoming more actively involved in managing them when
needed, encouraging counsel and the parties to cooperate during discovery, adopting informal
discovery dispute resolution methods, shifting the costs of discovery from the producing party to
the requesting party, phasing discovery, using computer technology and sampling techniques to
reduce the cost of reviewing voluminous electronic files, limiting the amount of time parties
must spend responding to discovery requests, imposing sanctions for improper behavior, and
capping the amount of discovery allowed based on an estimate of the likely range of recovery in
a case. I also identify seven “red flags” that provide early warning signs to a judge of the need to
intervene in a case to make sure that costs do not spiral out of control. These warning signs
include cases involving complex litigation or multiple parties, cases where there is unusually
great party or attorney animosity, cases involving discovery of electronically stored information,
cases where there are issues regarding spoliation of evidence, pro se litigation, and asymmetrical
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litigation. In discussing these warning signs, I give examples of how a judge may intervene using
the “proportionality toolkit” to keep costs in check.
Finally, based on a survey of United States district and magistrate judges, I offer an
explanation why achieving proportionality may have been so difficult, and offer suggestions
regarding how to educate judges better about how to use the proportionality tools identified in
the case analysis to be more successful at achieving proportionality. My ultimate conclusion is
that, by using the techniques I identify, combined with an aggressive education program for
judges regarding how to use the “proportionality toolkit” and recognize the warning signs, it will
indeed be possible to stop the insanity.
Preliminarily, some perspective will help focus the analysis. In May, 2010, prominent
federal and state judges, academics, and attorneys representing all segments of the litigation bar,
as well as representatives of bar organizations, government and corporations, attended a
conference that the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (“the Advisory
Committee”) convened at the Duke University School of Law. The purpose was to take a critical
look at the current state of civil litigation in the United States and to identify specific strategies
for improvement to enable it to better fulfill the goal of securing “the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every [civil] action and proceeding.”2 Among the goals of the
conference was to evaluate discovery in civil cases in federal court, and particularly to focus on
problems associated with discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”).3 In advance of
the Duke Conference, a number of prominent organizations representing a wide variety of

2

Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Preliminary Report to the Judicial Conference
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, October, 2009 at 5, available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf; Richard Marcus, How to
Steer an Ocean Liner, 18 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 615, 624 (2014).
3

4

participants in the civil litigation process conducted surveys of their members to obtain their
views regarding the effectiveness of the federal civil discovery rules. Among those groups were
the ABA Section of Litigation, the American College of Trial Lawyers (in conjunction with the
Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System), the Federal Judicial Center, the
Association of Corporate Counsel, and the National Employment Lawyers Association
(“NELA”). While there were areas of disagreement among the various surveys about the state of
health of the federal civil litigation process, there was wide agreement in 2009 that the process
takes too long, is too expensive, and that in too many cases the cost of discovery is
disproportionately expensive in relation to the value of the case or the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation.4
Those familiar with the federal rules of civil procedure could view this nearly universal
agreement only as an indictment of the effectiveness of more than thirty years of rulemaking
efforts to ensure that discovery costs were proportionate. This is because the civil rules first
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were amended to require proportionate discovery in 1983, and that requirement (although revised
and relocated various times within the rules) has been an overarching requirement of the
discovery process ever since.5 Accordingly, the starting point for the analysis must be the rules
themselves. Part One of this thesis will discuss the successive efforts of the civil rulemakers to
require proportionate discovery by examining the changes in the rules of civil procedure
addressing this requirement, and the accompanying advisory committee notes that illustrate the
goals of the rules and amendments. Part Two will discuss the results of an examination of nearly
two hundred discovery opinions that federal judges issued during the more than thirty years in
which the rules have required proportionate discovery, in which they acknowledged this
requirement and resolved discovery disputes with it in mind. The goal of Part Two is to
determine whether it is possible for judges to achieve proportional discovery, and, if so, to
identify an “inventory” of techniques that can be used to do so. Further, Part Two will identify a
number of risk factors that a review of the cases disclosed; these “red flags” presage the
possibility of disproportionate discovery and can serve as an early warning of the need for a
judge to exert more control over the discovery process. In Part Three, this thesis will discuss the
results of surveys of United States district and magistrate judges regarding their attitudes toward
handling discovery in civil cases, and the approach they take to doing so. The survey results
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discovery methods set forth [in the civil rules] . . . shall be limited by the court if it determines
that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information
sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of
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provide insight into why achieving proportionate discovery has been an elusive goal. Finally,
Part Four will offer suggestions as to what ought to be done to improve the situation.
Part One
A. Overview and the 1983 Rule Amendments
The belief that discovery costs in federal court frequently are disproportionate to the
value of the case has existed far longer than the thirty years that the civil rules have required
proportionality. The first codification of the federal rules of civil procedure occurred in 1938,6
and thirteen years thereafter Judge James M. Douglas, chair of the Judicial Conference Section
on Judicial Administration, convened a symposium regarding “The Practical Operation of
Federal Discovery.”7 During the symposium, William Speck reported the results of a field study
that the Administrative Office of the United States Courts conducted regarding the use of
discovery in the federal courts. Speck reported that the field study found that, after thirteen years
of using the federal discovery rules, “generally speaking the lawyers we talked to liked
discovery,” but that shortcomings were noted, and “[o]ne of the criticisms is that the expense and
time consumed by discovery is out of proportion to the value.”8
The first attempt in the federal rules of civil procedure to address directly the
proportionality issue in discovery occurred with the 1983 amendments to the civil rules.

6

Richard Marcus, How to Steer an Ocean Liner, supra, note 3, at 618.
The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 131 (1951).
8
Id. at 137. Focusing on the cost of deposition discovery, Speck further illustrated the
proportionality concern. He disclosed that the survey revealed that the costs at that time of
taking a deposition of 100-150 pages in length in an “ordinary case” would be $200-300. He
observed that “[i]f 100 to 150 pages of depositions are reasonable in a tort case worth $20,000,
then 100,000 to 150,000 pages would be in proportion in a case worth $20,000,000.” Id. at 138.
At a cost of between two and three dollars a page, deposition discovery alone would run between
$200,000 and $300,000 (in 1951 dollars) for a case where $20,000,000 was at issue.
7

7

Specifically, the Advisory Committee amended Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (“Discovery Scope and
Limits”) to contain the following language:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in [the
discovery rules] shall be limited by the court if it determines that (i) the discovery
sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to
obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or
expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or
pursuant to a motion [for protective order] . . . .”9
Importantly, the Committee placed the new language in the section of Rule 26 that limits the
scope of discovery, indicating the Committee’s intent that the newly added factors would restrain
at the outset the amount of discovery that the parties could conduct. Rather than adopt brightline restrictions on the type of permissible discovery and how parties could employ it, the rules
opted for providing the parties and judges with a multi-factor analysis of how to tailor the
discovery in each case to its needs. Such a flexible approach necessarily requires that the court
monitor and manage the case (where needed), as the parties cannot apply the cost-benefit factors
identified in the rules in the abstract. The Committee Note accompanying these changes
explained why they were added and how the Committee hoped they would govern the conduct of
discovery. First, the Committee observed that “[t]he purpose of discovery is to provide a
mechanism for making relevant information available to the litigants,” and that “the spirit of the
rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to
expose the facts and illuminate the issues by overuse of discovery or unnecessary use of the
defensive weapons or evasive responses.”10 When parties employ such abusive techniques, “this
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results in excessively costly and time-consuming activities that are disproportionate to the nature
of the case, the amount involved, or the issues or values at stake.”11 With these words, the
Committee introduced the concept of proportionality as a limiting factor on the amount of
discovery that the parties should seek, or the court should permit, in a civil case. The Committee
Note further discussed the rationale for the changes to the Rule.
First, the Committee amended Rule 26(b)(1) “to add a sentence to deal with the problem
with over-discovery,” with the goal of “guard[ing] against redundant or disproportionate
discovery by giving the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to
matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry.”12 Fundamentally, the new rule imposed
on the trial judge the duty to guard against disproportionate discovery, as the Committee plainly
stated that “[t]he new sentence is intended to encourage judges to be more aggressive in
identifying and discouraging discovery overuse,” noting that “[o]n the whole . . . district judges
have been reluctant to limit the use of the discovery devices.”13 Thus, the concept of the trial
judge as an active participant in the monitoring and, as needed, the management of the discovery
process in an individual case was integral to the Committee’s view of how to combat
disproportionately expensive or burdensome discovery. Simply put, the Committee recognized
that reliance on the parties alone to achieve the proportionality required by the new rules would
not be effective. Judges could not delegate the entire discovery process to the parties
themselves, but would have to monitor their cases and intervene where needed to manage the
discovery process on an individual basis for the rules to succeed. While the parties would have a
critical role in designing and executing the discovery, the judge needed to be a part of that
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process—from its inception to its conclusion. The Committee Note further explained how the
Committee intended the new rule to operate.
The Committee designed new Rule 26(b)(1)(i) “to minimize the redundancy in
discovery” and to “encourage attorneys to be sensitive to the comparative costs of different
methods of securing information,” and introduced subdivision (b)(1)(ii) “to reduce repetitiveness
and to oblige lawyers to think through their discovery activities in advance so that full utilization
is made of each deposition, document request, or set of interrogatories.”14 The concomitant
amendment of Rule 26(g), which was to govern the signing of discovery requests, responses, and
objections, reinforced the notion that the attorneys conducting discovery had an independent
duty to ensure that discovery in a case was not disproportionate. The Committee amended that
rule to provide:
Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by
an attorney shall sign the request, response, or objection and state his address.
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that he has read
the request, response, or objection, and that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with
these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome
or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation.15
The Committee Note addressed in significant detail just how Rule 26(g) should regulate
attorney conduct during discovery. It stated: “Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty to engage
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in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and purposes of
Rules 26 through 37 [which govern all the discovery devices].”16 Perhaps recognizing that
attorneys might need encouragement to fulfill this responsibility, the Committee observed that
“Rule 26(g) is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of
sanctions,” noting that it “provides a deterrent to both excessive discovery and evasion by
imposing a certification requirement that obliges each attorney to stop and think about the
legitimacy of a discovery request, a response thereto, or an objection.”17
Essentially, the discovery rules needed to provide an adequate deterrent for litigants and
their lawyers who otherwise might abuse the process. “If primary responsibility for conducting
discovery is to continue to rest with the litigants, they must be obliged to act responsively and
avoid abuse.”18 Accordingly, the “certification duty requires the lawyer to pause and consider
the reasonableness of his request, response, or objection,” by making “a reasonable inquiry into
the factual basis of his response, request, or objection.”19 A lawyer complies with this duty “if
the investigation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn therefrom are reasonable
under the circumstances,” and in doing so, the lawyer “may rely on assertions by the client and
on communications with other counsel in the case as long as that reliance is appropriate under
the circumstances,” with the court to decide “what is reasonable . . . on the totality of the
circumstances.”20
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Having clearly stated the responsibility of both the trial judge and the litigants’ lawyers to
ensure proportionate discovery in each case, the Committee Note further addressed how the new
Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) would guide them in doing so.
The elements of Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) address the problem of discovery that is
disproportionate to the individual lawsuit as measured by such matters as its
nature and complexity, the importance of the issues at stake in a case seeking
damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant to withstand extensive
opposition to a discovery program or to respond to discovery requests, and the
significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic, social, or
institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy
spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved. The court must apply the
standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a
war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or
affluent.21
Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) introduced a highly nuanced series of cost-benefit factors for the lawyers and
trial judge the consider in each case to ensure that the discovery conducted was proportionate.
Yet the Committee clearly designed it to protect against any mechanistic approach to limiting
discovery that would not be appropriate in a particular case, given the substantive issues
involved, the importance of the type of litigation, and the resources of the plaintiff and
defendant. It was an important innovation, essential to ensuring that judges and lawyers
interpreted and applied the discovery rules as a whole in a manner consistent with the goal of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 that the rules of civil procedure “be construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action.”22 Therefore, while Rule (26)(b)(1)(iii) introduced
“cost-benefit” analysis to determining how much discovery is appropriate in a given case,
allowing consideration of the likely amount of recovery if successful, the parties and judge were
not to apply it in an unfair manner. Rather, they were to consider the “value” of a case in light of
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its “philosophic, social or institutional terms.” For example, “Public Policy” cases involving
issues such as employment discrimination claims or free speech claims often require extensive
discovery, yet may not produce a large-dollar judgment for the successful litigant. Betterfinanced opponents should not be able to employ delaying tactics to exhaust a financially weak
party’s ability to prosecute the action.
The Committee intended the combined effect of the changes to Rules 26(b)(1) and 26(g)
to introduce a profound change in the way parties conducted discovery. No longer were they to
conduct discovery reflexively; rather, they were to conduct it reflectively. No longer was
discovery to be the province of the lawyers alone, conducted without any oversight and
susceptible to abuse for tactical advantage or to impose oppressive burden; the trial judge had an
independent duty to ensure that it was tailored to be both cost-effective and fair. Properly
conducted, planning and executing discovery in a particular case would not be haphazard.
Lawyers would need to make a reasonable inquiry of their clients before asking for discovery,
responding to a discovery request, or even making an objection to one—and certify by his or her
signature that this had been done, under pain of sanctions if not. Judges could no longer sit
passively on the sidelines and delegate all discovery responsibilities to the lawyers, becoming
involved only when a party presented a dispute for them to resolve; they had an independent duty
to monitor the discovery in all their cases and to manage more directly the process where needed
to ensure that discovery was fair and proportionate. And no longer could discovery be reduced
to competing objectives of asking for everything an imaginative lawyer could want, or providing
as little an evasive lawyer could get away with. Instead, the lawyers and the judge had to factor
in the type of case, the issues at stake (as measured by the goals of the litigants, as well as the
broader societal issues implicated by the case), the relief requested, and the comparative
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resources of the parties. In short, the 1983 changes to the discovery rules ambitiously sought to
inaugurate a new approach to discovery. The Advisory Committee had announced in stentorian
tones what needed to be done. What remained to be seen was whether the judges and lawyers
were listening.
B. The 1993 and 2000 Rule Amendments
Just ten years after the Committee amended Rule 26(b)(1) to adopt the proportionality
standard, it amended the rule again, in subtle but important ways. First, it divided the paragraph
into two numbered sub-paragraphs. The first contained the general discussion of the type of
information that is subject to discovery; the second, titled “limitations,” allowed courts to issue
orders or adopt local rules to alter the numerical limits on discovery elsewhere contained in the
rules, and included the proportionality language with two revisions. First, former Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) became 26(b)(2)(iii), and the Committee revised it to say “the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” instead of “the discovery is unduly
burdensome or expensive.”23 Second, the Committee revised Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) to add the
following factor: “the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues.”24 The
Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 rule change explained the reason for these revisions:
[Rule 26(b)(1) (1983)] is revised in several respects. First, former paragraph (1) is
subdivided into two paragraphs for ease of reference and to avoid renumbering of
paragraphs (3) and (4). Textual changes are then made in new paragraph (2) to
enable the court to keep tighter rein on the extent of discovery. The information
explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of wideranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for
delay or oppression . . . . The revisions in Rule 26(b)(2) are intended to provide
the court with broader discretion to impose additional restrictions on the scope
and extent of discovery and to authorize courts that develop case tracking systems
based on the complexity of cases to increase or decrease by local rule the
presumptive number of depositions and interrogatories allowed in particular types
23
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or classifications of cases. The revision also dispels any doubt as to the power of
the court to impose limitations on the length of depositions under Rule 30 or on
the number of requests for admissions under Rule 36.25
As its Note made clear, the Advisory Committee was concerned about the “information
explosion” brought about by the increasing use of computer based information systems instead
of “paper based” systems, and the potential for vastly greater discovery costs associated with
trying to obtain all “relevant” information when it might be stored on many computers.
Accordingly, the message the Committee sent to judges was that they needed to restrict
discovery even further if necessary to prevent it from being “oppressive.” The 1993 changes
also relocated the proportionality factors to the subsection of Rule 26 discussing limits on the
number of depositions, interrogatories and requests for admission that an order or local rule
could impose, disassociating them from their original location at the beginning of the Rules,
defining the scope of discovery. As will be seen, subsequent amendments to the rule further
disassociated the proportionality factors from the language setting out the scope of discovery, a
development now reversed by the 2015 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that took
effect on December 1, 2015.26
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In 2000, the Advisory Committee amended Rule 26(b)(1) (which defines the scope of
discovery) to add the following sentence: “All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by
Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).”27 As the Advisory Committee Note explained,
a sentence has been added [to Rule 26(b)(1)] calling attention to the limitations of
subdivision (b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii). These limitations apply to discovery that is
otherwise within the scope of subdivision (b)(1). The Committee has been told
repeatedly that courts have not implemented these limitations with the vigor that
was contemplated . . . . This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added
to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control
excessive discovery.28
Thus, the Committee acknowledged that, despite the presence of the proportionality factors as a
limitation on the scope of discovery that had existed for seventeen years, they had not produced
their intended effect. The courts had failed to implement these limitations with “vigor.”
C. The 2006 Rule Amendments
In 2006, the Advisory Committee changed the Rules of Civil Procedure again to address
concerns about the expense and burden that expansive discovery of electronically stored
information, or “ESI,” increasingly caused. It amended Rule 26(b)(2) “to address issues raised
by difficulties in locating, retrieving, and providing discovery of some electronically stored
information.”29 As part of these changes, the Committee divided Rule 26(b)(2) into three
subparagraphs. The first contained the existing authority for courts to issue orders altering the
limits in the rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories, and to issue local rules to
limit the number of requests for admissions.30 The second added new language to address issues

resolving discovery disputes.”) (emphasis added), available at
www.uscourts.gov/file/14523/download.
27
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
28
Advisory Committee Note (2000) (discussing change to Rule 26(b)(1)).
29
Advisory Committee Note (2006) (discussing amendments to Rule 26(b)(2)).
30
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(A) (2006).
16

associated with discovery of ESI from sources that are not readily accessible because of undue
burden or cost.31 The third contained the proportionality language introduced in 1983, and
modified in 1993 and 2000.32
D. The Duke Conference
Despite the 2006 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, complaints persisted from
judges, practitioners and a wide variety of bar associations that the costs of discovery in civil
cases continued to be disproportionately expensive. The Advisory Committee decided to host a
conference to discuss these concerns and identify means to address them. The Committee’s
report to the Chief Justice succinctly stated its purpose:
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee hosted the 2010 Conference on Civil
Litigation at the Duke University School of Law on May 10 and 11 [2010]. The
Conference was designed as a disciplined identification of litigation problems and
exploration of the most promising opportunities to improve federal civil litigation.
More than seventy judges, lawyers, and academics presented and discussed
empirical information, analytical papers, pilot projects, and various approaches
used by both federal and state judges, in considering ways to address the problems
of costs and delays in the federal civil justice system. Over 200 invited
participants selected to ensure diverse views, expertise, and experience filled all
the space available at the Law School and engaged in two days of panel
presentations followed by extensive audience discussion. The result is a large
amount of empirical information and a rich array of possible approaches to
improving how the federal courts serve civil litigants.33
The Report to the Chief Justice identified the findings of the Duke Conference regarding
the problems associated with the civil discovery process and underscored the failure of prior
rulemaking efforts to achieve proportional discovery costs. It noted:
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (2006).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2006).
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Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation,
Submitted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure (hereinafter “Report to the Chief Justice”) at 1, available at
www.uscourts.gov/file/3115/download.
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For many years, the Judicial Conference Rules Committees have heard
complaints about the costs, delays, and burdens of civil litigation in the federal
courts. And for many years, the Rules Committees have worked to address these
complaints. That work is reflected in the fact that the Civil Rules, particularly the
discovery rules, have been amended more frequently than any others. The more
recent changes have been preceded by efforts to obtain reliable empirical
information to identify how the rules are operating and the likely effect of
proposed changes. Despite these recent rule changes, complaints about costs,
delays, and burdens in civil litigation have persisted.34
Importantly, the Duke Conference highlighted the need to base future rulemaking changes on
more than anecdotal information, however well regarded the sources, and to consider empirical
data as well.35 The empirical data reviewed during the conference included a study that the
Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) performed of more than 3,500 cases that terminated in the last
quarter of 2008, which contained “detailed surveys of the lawyers about their experience in the
cases.”36 Further, the FJC “also administered surveys for the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association (ABA) and for the National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA),” which
the Duke Conference considered. 37 In addition, the Institute for the Advancement of the
American Legal System (IAALS) submitted a survey of the members of the American College of
Trial Lawyers (American College), and the Advisory Committee reviewed empirical information
that the Searle Institute at Northwestern Law School and a consortium of large corporations
provided regarding the actual costs of conducting discovery in civil litigation, all of which
“provided an important anchor for the Conference discussion and will be a basis for further
assessment of the federal civil justice system for years to come.”38
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Moreover, the providers of information to the Advisory Committee, and the participants
at the Duke Conference, represented not just the views of institutional participants in the
litigation process, on whom the costs and burdens of discovery often fall the most, but also an
extremely diverse group including judges, academics, lawyers from many types of practices,
from firms that were large as well as small and representing plaintiffs, defendants, businesses,
governments, and public interest organizations.39
The conclusions that the Advisory Committee reached from the Duke Conference
included a recognition that “making changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [alone] is
not sufficient to make meaningful improvements” in the civil litigation process.40 Rather,
“judicial education, legal education, and support provided by the development of materials to
facilitate implementing more efficient and effective procedures”41 needed to accompany future
rules changes. Distilled to its essence, the lessons learned from the Duke Conference could be
“described in two words—cooperation and proportionality—and one phrase—sustained, active,
hands-on judicial case management.”42
While the Advisory Committee acknowledged that rule changes alone would not fully
ameliorate the problems that the Duke Conference identified, it concluded that properly focused
rule changes could contribute to the needed solutions, and it identified a number of desirable
changes. One of them focused on the need to emphasize further the proportionality requirement
of Rule 26(b)(2). Specifically, the Advisory Committee observed that “[t]here is continuing
concern that the proportionality provisions of Rule 26(b)(2), added in 1983, have not
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accomplished what was intended. Again, however, there was no suggestion that this rule
language should be changed. Rather the discussion focused on proposals to make the
proportionality limit more effective . . . .”43 As next will be seen, this recommendation resulted
in an additional round of rulemaking changes by the Advisory Committee, which again
addressed the provisions of Rule 26(b)(b)(2) that deal with proportionality and the scope of
discovery.
E. The 2015 Rule Amendments
The Advisory Committee began its work with the benefit of the lessons learned during
the Duke Conference. Judge John Koeltl of the Southern District of New York chaired a
subcommittee to develop proposed amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure to implement the
Duke Conference recommendations. To do so the
[s]ubcommittee began with a list of proposals made at the Duke Conference and
held numerous conference calls, circulated drafts of proposed rules, and
sponsored a mini-conference with 25 invited judges, lawyers, and law professors
to discuss possible rule amendments. The Subcommittee presented
recommendations for full discussion by the Committee and the Standing
Committee during meetings held in 2011, 2012, and 2013 . . . . The proposed
Duke amendments were published as a package in August 2013 along with . . .
other proposed amendments . . . . More than 2,300 written comments were
received and more than 120 witnesses appeared and addressed the Committee in
public hearings held in Washington, D.C., Phoenix, and Dallas. Following the
public comment process, the Subcommittee withdrew some proposals, [and]
amended others . . . .44
Among the rule amendments adopted was a change to Rule 26(b)(1)—the “scope of discovery
rule”—the essence of which Judge David Campbell, Chair of the Advisory Committee, described
as follows:
The proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) include four elements: (1) the factors
included in the present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) [part of the proportionality factors]
43
44

Id. at 8.
Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-3.
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are moved up to become part of the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1),
identifying elements to be considered in determining whether discovery is
proportional to the needs of the case; (2) language regarding the discovery of
sources of information is removed as unnecessary; (3) the distinction between
discovery of information relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses and discovery
of information relevant to the subject matter of the action, on a showing of good
cause, is eliminated; [and] (4) the sentence allowing discovery of information
‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is
rewritten. . . . .45
With respect to the first of the suggested revisions, the Advisory Committee proposed to amend
the first sentence of Rule 26(b)(1) to say:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case,
considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’
resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.46
In a Memorandum to the Standing Committee, submitted in preparation for the September, 2014
meeting of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Judge Campbell described the care with
which the Advisory Committee determined to recommend this change. He explained:
[The proposal to relocate the proportionality factors to Rule 26(b)(1)] produced a
division in the public comments. Many favored the proposal. They asserted that
the costs of discovery in civil litigation are too often out of proportion to the
issues at stake in the litigation, resulting in cases not being filed or settlements
made to avoid litigation costs regardless of the merits. They stated that
disproportionate litigation costs bar many from access to federal courts and have
resulted in a flight to other dispute resolution fora such as arbitration. They noted
that the proportionality factors currently found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) often are
overlooked by courts and litigants, and that the proposed relocation of those
factors to Rule 26(b)(1) will help achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action . . . . Many others saw proportionality as a new limit
that would favor defendants. They criticized the factors from Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) as subjective and so flexible as to defy uniform application. They
asserted that “proportionality” will become a new blanket objection to all
discovery requests. They were particularly concerned that proportionality would
impose a new burden on the requesting party to justify each and every discovery
request. Some argued that the proposed change is a solution in search of a
45
46
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problem—that discovery in civil litigation already is proportional to the needs of
cases . . . . After considering these public comments carefully, the Committee
remains convinced that transferring the Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) factors to the scope
of discovery . . . will improve the rules governing discovery.47
The Advisory Committee reached this conclusion for three reasons. First, the findings of the
Duke Conference, based on the empirical studies submitted and the discussions among the
experienced participants—representing the views of the entire litigation spectrum—demonstrated
widespread consensus that, as currently practiced in federal court, discovery on the whole was
disproportionately expensive and burdensome.48 Second, the history of nearly thirty years of
rulemaking designed to inculcate the proportionality factors into the conduct of discovery in civil
cases had been unsuccessful in achieving the intended goal.49 Finally, as expansively discussed
in the proposed Advisory Committee Note drafted to accompany the proposed change to Rule
26(b)(1) (discussed next), the Advisory Committee carefully addressed the concerns of those
opposed to the change, to make clear its intent that courts should not interpret the changes in a
manner that would allow the feared abuses to occur.50
The Advisory Committee Note to the changes to Rule 26(b)(1) explained that thechanges
did not impose any new responsibilities on the part of courts or the parties with respect to
proportionality, stating that “[r]estoring the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not
change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality, and
the change does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all
proportionality considerations.”51 This language addressed concerns expressed during the public
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comment period that the proposed new rule language would place an impossible burden on a
requesting party by requiring that party to demonstrate a factual basis for each of the
proportionality factors, despite the fact that—without the desired discovery—they would not
have the ability to do so. Whichever party had access to the information needed to apply the
proportionality factors to a particular discovery dispute would be responsible for providing it to
the court. And, the addition of the consideration of “the parties’ relative access to relevant
information”52 to the factors proposed for Rule 26(b)(1) reinforced this protection against undue
burden being placed on requesting parties.
Second, the Advisory Committee Note addressed concerns that parties requested to
provide discovery would use the new rule language to stonewall by making blanket, conclusory
objections (often referred to as “boilerplate objections”), forcing the requesting party to incur the
cost of filing a motion to compel. The Note stated: “Nor is the change intended to permit the
opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that it is not
proportional. The parties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider the
proportionality of all discovery and consider it in resolving discovery disputes.”53 The Advisory
Committee Note added a specific example of how the Committee intended the new rule to be
implemented, to illustrate how the parties were to fulfill the “collective responsibility”:
The parties may begin discovery without a full appreciation of the factors that
bear on proportionality. A party requesting discovery, for example, may have
little information about the burden or expense of responding. A party requested to
provide discovery may have little information about the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues as understood by the requesting party. Many of
these uncertainties should be addressed and reduced in the parties’ Rule 26(f)
conference [requiring the parties to confer early in the case to develop a discovery
plan] and in scheduling and pretrial conferences with the court. But if the parties
continue to disagree, the discovery dispute could be brought before the court and
52
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the parties’ responsibilities would remain as they have been since 1983. A party
claiming undue burden or expense ordinarily has far better information—perhaps
the only information—with respect to that part of the determination. A party
claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should be able to explain
the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that party
understands them. The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided
by the parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a casespecific determination of the appropriate scope of discovery.54
Third, the Advisory Committee Note discussed the rationale for adding “the parties’
relative access to relevant information” as a new proportionality factor, observing that the “new
text [is intended] to provide explicit focus on considerations already implicit in present Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).”55 The Note observed that parties often enter litigation with vastly different
access to the information that will be needed to resolve the case. It explained that “[s]ome cases
involve what often is called ‘information asymmetry.’ One party—often an individual
plaintiff—may have little discoverable information . . . [while] [t]he other party may have vast
amounts of information, including information that can be readily retrieved.”56 In such
circumstances, “the burden of responding to discovery lies heavier on the party who has more
information, and properly so.”57
Fourth, the Advisory Committee Note stressed the importance of active judicial
monitoring of the discovery process in all cases, and, where needed, intervention to manage the
process to prevent disproportional cost or excessive delay. It stated:
The present amendment again reflects the need for continuing and close judicial
involvement in the cases that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective party
management. It is expected that discovery will be effectively managed by the
parties in many cases. But there will be important occasions for judicial
management, both when the parties are legitimately unable to resolve important
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differences and when the parties fall short of effective, cooperative management
on their own.58
In short, the abuses that opponents to the new rules feared would occur if the Supreme
Court approved the new language should not occur (if judges implement the rules as intended)
for two reasons. First, the parties themselves have a duty, imposed by Rule 26(g)(1), to consider
proportionality when making discovery requests, responding to them, or objecting to them.
Necessarily implicit in this requirement, and reinforced by the requirement of Rule 26(f) that the
parties confer early in the case to discuss discovery, is the expectation—indeed necessity—that
there be cooperation between the parties. Second, when the parties themselves are unable or
unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities, the rule obligates court to step in to manage the
discovery to ensure that it is proportional.
Fifth, the Advisory Committee Note stressed the importance of not attempting to measure
proportionality solely in terms of the monetary value of the case. It reiterated Note language
from earlier versions of Rule 26(b) that explained the importance of considering the substantive
issues in a case that involves little prospect of a large monetary recovery for the plaintiff, but
nonetheless involves important societal issues. It stated:
It also is important to repeat the caution that the monetary stakes are only one
factor, to be balanced against other factors. The 1983 Committee Note
recognized “the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in philosophic,
social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public
policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may
have importance far beyond the monetary amount involved.” Many other
substantive areas also may involve litigation that seeks relatively small amounts
of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to vindicate vitally important
personal or public values.59

58
59

Id.
Id. at Appendix B41-42.
25

Finally, the Advisory Committee Note discussed how the judge and the parties should
evaluate the parties’ resources in determining whether the discovery sought is disproportionately
burdensome or expensive and how the parties may use current and future technological
advancements to reduce burden or expense. It stated:
So too, considerations of the parties’ resources does not foreclose discovery
requests addressed to an impecunious party, nor justify unlimited discovery
requests addressed to a wealthy party . . . . The burden or expense of proposed
discovery should be determined in a realistic way. This includes the burden or
expense of producing electronically stored information. Computer-based methods
of searching such information continue to develop, particularly for cases
involving large volumes of electronically stored information. Courts and parties
should be willing to consider the opportunities for reducing the burden or expense
of discovery as reliable means of searching electronically stored information
become available.60
The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 2015 changes to the proportionality
requirements of Rule 26(b) demonstrate the care and attention to detail that characterized the
Committee’s most recent changes. It was under no illusion about the lack of success of earlier
attempts to introduce proportionality into the discovery rules, and it took pains to try to identify
why those efforts had not succeed, and to adopt measures that—if implemented by the parties
and the court—would overcome the earlier failures. Reduced to their essence, the success of the
new changes indeed will hinge on the two words and a phrase that the Advisory Committee
identified—“cooperation” and “proportionality,” and “sustained, active, hands-on judicial case
management.”61
The Advisory Committee has refined the factors underlying proportionality and provided
clear guidance about what is needed to achieve them. But having done so, what is the likelihood
that this time—unlike the earlier attempts—the goal will be achieved? It is clear that the judge
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holds the key to success for achieving proportionality. If the parties themselves approach
discovery cooperatively and take measures to balance need against burden and expense, the
judge’s role can be supervisory—monitoring rather than directing the process. However, where
the parties and their counsel appear unable or unwilling to do so, the Advisory Committee
structured the rules to require the judge to step up and actively manage the discovery process in
cases requiring it. Either way, the rules impose a critical role on the judge.
If the new rules are to succeed, then it is necessary to transition from discussing
abstractions such as “cooperation,” “proportionality” and “active and sustained judicial
management” to identifying concrete tools that judges and litigants can use to achieve
proportionality in individual cases. Expressed differently, the fundamental questions are: Is it
possible for judges to monitor and manage discovery so that it is proportional, and, if it is, how
should they do so? To answer these questions, it will be necessary to accomplish two goals. First
is the identification of specific actions that litigants or the court can take in individual cases to
reduce burden and expense, so that the court can be aware of the “tools” that are available to do
so. Second is the identification of the types of cases or circumstances that are most likely to lead
to disproportionate and burdensome discovery, so that the judge is aware of these “red flags” and
can intervene to take measures to address them before discovery costs spiral out of control.
Part Two of this thesis undertakes to address these two questions. By analyzing nearly
two hundred cases decided since 1983 in which courts discussed the proportionality requirement
and, with this awareness in mind, proceeded to resolve discovery disputes that threatened to
make discovery excessively burdensome or expensive, I have identified the tools that parties and
judges actually have used. Similarly, by focusing on the types of cases and circumstances that
actually have presented proportionality problems for courts to resolve, I have identified the “red
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flags” that attorneys, parties and courts must be alert to notice, so that they can address
proportionality issues at the onset of the case, when the best opportunities to control discovery
are available.
Part Two
A. Overview
To identify cases in which judges demonstrated an awareness of the proportionality
requirements of Rule 26(b), I designed computer search terms to capture the different rule
number applicable to the proportionality factors between 1983 and 2006, during which time the
Committee amended and renumbered the rules.62 After trying various combinations of search
terms, I selected and used three to search reported and unreported federal cases on the
WestlawNext database.63 The searches produced 193 cases, which I then reviewed and indexed
to identify the type of judicial officer deciding the case,64 the type of case or circumstance that
led to the discovery dispute, and the method the judge used to resolve it. In broad terms, the
following observations can be made regarding the cases reviewed. First, the vast majority of
cases (67%) were decided by United States magistrate judges, an unsurprising result given the
frequency with which district judges refer pretrial case management or discovery disputes to
them for resolution. In most of the remaining cases (28%), district judges issued the opinion,
most often when ruling on objections that the parties raised to initial rulings by magistrate
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Because the 2015 rule changes did not become effective until December 1, 2015, no cases
have been decided as of the writing of this thesis applying them.
63
The three search term combinations were: (1) ((RULE FRCP “FED. R. CIV. P.”)/3 26(B)(1) &
(CUMULATIVE DUPLICATIVE BURDEN! EXPENS!)) & da(aft 1/1/1983 & bef 12/31/1995)
& proportion!; (2) ((RULE FRCP “FED. R. CIV. P.”)/3 26(B)(2) % INSURANCE) & da(aft
1/1/1993 & bef 12/31/2008) & proportion!; and (3) ((RULE FRCP “FED. R. CIV. P.”) 3
26(B)(2)(2)(C)) & da(aft 1/1/2006) & proportion!
64
Types included district judge, magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, and special master.
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judges, but also when the district judge resolved the dispute without referring it to a magistrate
judge. In a very small number of cases (5%), bankruptcy judges or a special master issued the
opinion.
Second, while in each of the cases reviewed, the judge cited to the applicable version of
Rule 26 containing the proportionality factors, they most often discussed them in general at the
beginning of the decision, when citing to other portions of Rule 26 that govern discovery,65 and
did not engage in detailed discussion of the proportionality factors when actually resolving the
discovery dispute.66 In some cases, the judge would cite specifically to one of the proportionality
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For example, they cited the provisions of Rule 26(b)(1) and (5) that limit the scope of
discovery to nonprivileged information that is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation
(until the rule was changed in 2000 to narrow the scope of discovery to information relevant to
the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings, with broader discovery of facts relevant to the
subject matter of the dispute only on a showing of good cause), and not subject to work product
protection.
66 Examples of such cases are: Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10–3095,
2012 WL 1656738, at *33 (D.N.J. May 10, 2012) (Defendant objected to producing--during
litigation phase--records previously produced during administrative investigation conducted by
EEOC. Court cited 26(b)(2)(C) and the doctrine of proportionality generally before denying
EEOC’s motion to compel, because the discovery would be “unreasonably cumulative.” );
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 10-4126, 2011 WL
2148660, at *11-12 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (In addressing discovery dispute, Court cited
26(b)(2)(C) and the doctrine of proportionality in general when describing the scope of
discovery, but did not refer to it in detail when ruling on motion); Int’l Paper Co. v. Rexam, Inc.,
No. 11-6494, 2013 WL 3043638, at *7 (D.N.J. June 17, 2013) (Court cited 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) and
the doctrine of proportionality generally, expressed concern that defendant’s document
production requests raised issues of proportionality, and required defendant to resubmit them
after modifying them to address its concerns); Thompson v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 12-CV-00391,
2014 WL 595911, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (In discussing the scope of discovery, Court
referenced 26(b)(2)(C) and the doctrine of proportionality without any detailed analysis in
resolving discovery motions); Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC , No. 08-4168, 2012 WL
1299379, at *4, 7 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (Addressing discovery dispute, Court cited 26(b)(2)(C)
and the doctrine of proportionality in general, but did not cite any subsections or particularize
how the rule should be used to resolve the dispute); Carchietta v. Russo, No. 11-CV-7587, 2014
WL 1789459, at *3-4 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014) (Court discussed 26(b)(2)(C) and proportionality in
general as part of the scope of discovery, but did not use the rule to resolve the discovery dispute,
which turned on privilege issues); Teck Metals, Ltd. v. London Mkt. Ins., No. CV-05-411, 2010
WL 4813807, at *2 (E. D. Wa. Aug. 25, 2010) (Court cited Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) in discussion
29

subsections of Rule 26(b), such as Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (which permits limiting discovery if it is
“unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome or less expensive”);67 Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) (which allows the judge
to limit discovery if “the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action”)68 or Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (which permits the judge to

regarding the scope of discovery without applying it in resolving dispute over interrogatories and
document production requests); Dawson v. Ocean Twp., No. 09-6274, 2011 WL 890692, at *1213 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2012) (Court cited Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) and mentioned doctrine of
proportionality as part of discussion of scope of discovery without applying or discussing it
further in resolving the discovery dispute); Best Sign Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, No. 09-5244, 2012
WL 4505996, at *11 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2012) (Court cited Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii) and doctrine of
proportionality as part of discussion of scope of discovery, but did not apply it in resolving
dispute); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gilkison, No. 5:05CV202, 2012 WL 1354569, at *2-4 (N. D. W.
Va. Apr. 18, 2012) (In affirming the ruling of the magistrate judge, court found that magistrate
judge properly had considered the doctrine of proportionality and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) in resolving
discovery dispute).
Examples of such cases are: Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. FAPS, Inc., No. 10–3095,
2012 WL 1656738, at *33 (D.N.J. May 10, 2012) (Court denied EEOC motion to compel
because the same documents previously had been provided by defendant to the EEOC during the
administrative investigation phase, and doing so again would be unreasonably duplicative or
cumulative, citing 26(b)(2)(C)(i)); High Voltage Beverages, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., No.
3:08CV367, 2009 WL 2915026, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2009) (Court denied plaintiff’s motion
to compel defendant to review and produce ESI from an additional 17gb of information (1.5
million pages) considering production that already had been made, because it was unreasonably
cumulative, contrary to 26(b)(2)(C)(i), and also found the additional production would
contravene 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) and (iii)); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C
5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (In antitrust class action case, court
found that through encouraging cooperative approach and with active case management there
were less burdensome, cumulative and duplicative ways to obtain discovery than sought by
plaintiffs, citing 26(b)(2)(C)(i) (as well as (ii) and (iii)).
67

68

Examples of such cases are: High Voltage Beverages, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 3:08CV367,
2009 WL 2915026, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 8, 2009) (Court denied plaintiffs motion to compel the
defendant to review and produce ESI from an additional 17gb (1.5 million pages) citing all three
sub-sections of 26(b)(2)(C), including (ii), because defendant already had produced 1.7 million
pages of ESI); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 97-2600, 2008 WL 1757929, at
*4-6 (D.N.J. Feb. 27, 2008) (district judge analyzed all three sub-sections of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
with respect to proportionality and found violations of all, including that plaintiff already had
ample opportunity to obtain relevant information from prior discovery, citing Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(ii)).
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limit discovery if “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues”).69 However, even when citing to a specific proportionality factor, the discussion
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Examples of such cases are: In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No.
3:12-MD-2391, 2013 WL 1729682, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2013) (Court denied plaintiffs’
motion to compel defendant to do predictive coding search of ESI because defendant already had
used keyword search, de-duplication and statistical sampling to reduce 19.5 million documents to
2.5 million documents, then used technology assisted review (“TAR”) on those documents to
produce documents to plaintiffs, at a cost of $1.07 million. Plaintiffs wanted TAR used on the
entire 19.5 million documents. Court declined, finding it was excessively burdensome given the
likely value of doing the additional search. Although court did not specifically cite
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), its analysis was based on it); Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 084168, 2012 WL 1299379, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (In an antitrust case, the court noted that
defendant had produced discovery from 110 custodians, involving 12 million pages, spending
4,200 hours collecting, and 86,000 hours of counsel review at a cost of more than $10 million.
Accordingly, it denied plaintiff’s motion to require defendants to review documents from an
additional 175 custodians because, inter alia, the burden and expense would outweigh the likely
benefit. Court only cited 26(b)(2)(C), but analysis brings it within (iii)); High Voltage
Beverages, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 3:08CV367, 2009 WL 2915026, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Sept.
8, 2009) (Court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant to review an additional 1.5 million
documents citing all three sub-sections of 26(b)(2)(C), including (iii) (cost would exceed likely
benefits)); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at
*9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (In a class action antitrust case, the court found that requiring the
defendant to answer one particular interrogatory would violate 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) because it would
require very detailed information to be compiled about each of 400 employees on a litigation
hold list, and the cost would exceed any likely benefit); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
285 F.R.D. 294, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (magistrate judge noted that Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) cautions
that importance of litigation is not measured by potential amount of monetary recovery, but
includes recognition of public interest litigation); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091,
2009 WL 3446761, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2009) (magistrate judge ordered plaintiff to share cost
of discovery of ESI from inaccessible source with defendant because, otherwise, cost would
exceed likely benefit (citing Rule 26(b)(2)(C) generally, but analysis stems from sub-section
(iii)); Oseman-Dean v. Ill. State Police, No. 11 C 1935, 2011 WL 6338834, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Dec.
19, 2011) (magistrate judge referenced Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) in explaining why relevance alone,
absent analysis of corresponding burden, was insufficient to warrant requested discovery, stating
that the rule “mandates that the court not allow the tail to wag the dog in discovery.”).
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tended to be cursory, and only a few of the cases reviewed contained an extensive discussion of
the proportionality factors.70
Third, a review of the methods that the judges actually used to resolve the dispute before
them reveals a robust and creative assortment of techniques that they employed to do so,
constituting a “proportionality toolkit” of sorts that provides examples that judges can draw on
and tailor to their dockets, their local culture, and their cases. These methods will be discussed in
detail below, and it is readily apparent that all of them are common-sense, pragmatic measures
that judges may employ, individually or in combination, to achieve proportionality in an
individual case, enabling the judge to tailor the response to the needs of the case, as guided by
the proportionality factors in Rule 26.71

70

One case (decided by the author of this thesis) that did discuss the proportionality requirement
in depth was Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. (D. Md. 2008). There, the
magistrate judge undertook an extensive examination of the proportionality factors, citing both
Rule 26(g)(1) as well as 26(b)(2)(C)(i)-(iii), and explained why cooperation among the parties
and counsel was essential to achieving it.
71
The techniques identified are: (1) active case monitoring and, as needed, management by the
judge; (2) appointment of a “judicial adjunct,” such as a magistrate judge, special master, or
other neutral to work with the parties to resolve discovery disputes; (3) informing counsel of
their duty to cooperate during discovery, and enforcing that duty when counsel are
uncooperative; (4) shifting all or part of the costs of discovery from the producing party to the
requesting party; (5) adopting informal discovery dispute resolution methods to expedite
resolution of discovery disputes, thereby avoiding the costs and delay of extensive briefing; (6)
narrowing the scope of discovery when what was sought was excessive; (7) phasing discovery to
focus first on the most important, and most accessible information; (8) prohibiting the use of
abusive discovery tactics such as the making of generalized, boilerplate objections; (9) reducing
the cost of ESI discovery by ordering sampling of large data sets, as opposed to reviewing all of
the data in the set; (10) ordering discovery from less burdensome or expensive sources than
originally sought; (11) adopting discovery protocols, standing orders or local rules that promote
proportionality; (12) directing or permitting the use of technological advances in computer
search methodology to lower search and review costs of ESI discovery; (13) estimating the likely
range of recovery in a case, as well as foreseeable costs, and providing a dollar cap on the
amount of permitted discovery; (14) capping the amount of time to be spent responding to
discovery requests; (15) enforcing the Rule 26(g)(1) proportionality certifications made by
counsel in initiating discovery, objecting to discovery, or responding to discovery; (16) imposing
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While the tools that judges may use to achieve proportional discovery are not themselves
complex, the selection of the appropriate tool or tools in a particular case can be, because it
requires the judge to have more than superficial knowledge of the issues and facts of the case to
apply the tools intelligently and fairly. The cases reviewed support the position that the
Committee Notes to the discovery rules took: that the most effective way to achieve proportional
discovery is with active, hands-on management of the discovery process by the court.
Finally, reviewing the cases where the parties asked the judges to resolve actual disputes
gives helpful insight into the circumstances or types of cases that are most likely to present
proportionality problems, thereby allowing judges to be alert at the outset to recognize and take
appropriate action to address them as early in the litigation as possible—underscoring once again
the importance of active judicial monitoring of all cases, with more direct management of the
discovery in individual cases that require it. These potentially troublesome cases will be
discussed in detail below.72
B. Techniques that Judges Used to Achieve Proportionality
1. Active Judicial Monitoring and Management of Discovery
Perhaps the single most important technique that judges used to achieve proportionality
was to engage in active monitoring of their cases, which enabled them to intervene as soon as

sanctions against lawyers and parties who violate the discovery rules without justification; and
(17) encouraging or permitting the use of non-waiver agreements pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502.
72
The type of cases or circumstances most likely to produce proportionality problems are: (1)
complex cases, such as securities cases, class actions, intellectual property cases, and complex
commercial cases; (2) cases involving ESI discovery; (3) cases in which there is client animosity
that drives the litigation; (4) cases involving over-aggressive or overzealous conduct by
attorneys, or in which attorney animosity or misconduct is present; (5) cases in which pro se
litigants are involved; (6) cases in which issues regarding preservation of evidence and claims of
spoliation of evidence are present; and (7) cases involving asymmetrical information, where one
party has far more information sought in discovery than the other.
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problems arose that could lead to excessively burdensome or costly discovery. Indeed, it may be
said that all of the other techniques discussed in this thesis are but subsets of this method,
because if a judge is not actively involved during discovery, the judge is not likely to employ any
other technique to resolve a dispute that the parties are unable to resolve on their own. That
active judicial monitoring of all cases, and more active management of those cases requiring it, is
of primary importance is unsurprising, considering the frequency with which it was cited in the
various surveys of lawyers that were reviewed by the Civil Rules Committee at the Duke
Conference73 and discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the changes to Rule
26(b) from 1983 to the present.74

73

For example, the ABA Section of Litigation Member Survey on Civil Practice, which was
reviewed by the Civil Rules Committee at the Duke Conference, contained the following survey
findings: “78% of respondents believe that early intervention by judges helps to narrow the
issues, and 72% believe that early intervention helps to limit discovery”; “73% of all respondents
believe that when a judicial officer gets involved early and stays involved, the results are more
satisfactory to their clients”; and “[d]espite claims of discovery abuse and cost, 61% of
respondents believe that counsel do not typically request limitations on discovery under available
mechanisms . . . 76% do not believe judges invoke those protections on their own . . . and nearly
60% of respondents believe that judges do not enforce those mechanisms to limit discovery.”
Similarly, the Final Report of the Joint Project of the American College of Trial Lawyers Task
Force on Discovery and the Institute for the Advance of the American Legal System concluded
that “ Judges should have a more active role at the beginning of a case in designing the scope of
discovery and the direction and timing of the case all the way to trial. Where abuses occur,
judges are perceived not to enforce the rules effectively. According to one Fellow, ‘Judges need
to actively manage each case from the outset to contain costs; nothing else will work.’” Duke
Surveys, supra, note 4.
74
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) Advisory Committee’s Note (1983) (“The rule [change introducing the
proportionality factors] contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and
thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.”); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(2) Advisory Committee Note (2000) (“The Committee has been told repeatedly
that courts have not implemented . . . [the proportionality factor] limitations with the vigor that
was contemplated. . . . This otherwise redundant cross-reference [to the proportionality factors]
has been added to emphasize the need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control
excessive discovery.”); Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26 (“In its report to the Chief
Justice, the Committee observed that ‘[o]ne area of consensus in the various [Duke] surveys . . .
was that district or magistrate judges must be considerably more involved in managing each case
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Judges demonstrated active case monitoring and management in many ways, which will
be discussed in detail below. Some examples, however, illustrate the creativity that judges intent
on achieving proportional discovery displayed. For example, they provided informal guidance to
the parties, without actually having to rule, to point them in the direction of how they could
achieve reasonable discovery at proportionate cost.75 Or, they announced their intention to
actively monitor the discovery that they would permit, to reduce burden and keep discovery
proportionate.76 Another way that courts demonstrated active case management was by adopting
informal methods to expedite the resolution of discovery disputes, without the need for full
briefing. In that way, they achieved proportionality by reducing both the time needed to resolve
the dispute and the cost to the parties of fully briefing the issues.77 This method is particularly

from the outset, to tailor the motions practice and shape the discovery to the reasonable needs of
the case.’”).
75
See, e.g., Teck Metals, Ltd v. London Mkt. Ins., No. CV-05-411, 2010 WL 4813807, at *2, *45, *9 (E.D. Wa. Aug 25, 2010) (Court was called upon to resolve dispute regarding interrogatory
and document production discovery. Citing Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the judge directed counsel to meet
and confer and provided them with guidance how to minimize the production burden on the
defendant, as well as suggestions regarding the form of production of ESI, and clarified the
scope of what was relevant, and suggested the use of a protective order to address defense
concerns.); Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, No. 11-cv-01606, 2012 WL 6181423,
at *4-5 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011) (In addressing a discovery dispute, the judge discussed Rule
26(g) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the requirement of proportionality, offering specific guidance
how the parties could narrow the scope of burdensome interrogatories to achieve
proportionality.); Plascencia v. BNC Mortg., Inc., LLC, No. 08-56305, 2012 WL 2161412, at *3,
*6-8, *11 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012) (Judge gave guidance to the parties regarding how
discovery practice should be conducted, referring counsel to a local rule that required
proportionality analysis to be a part of any motion to compel discovery.).
76
Boeynamems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 332 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (In a class action
fraud and breach of contract case, the judge noted that the number and nature of discovery
disputes in the case required him to conduct “active case management” to keep the scope of
discovery appropriate and to reduce the burden of discovery on the defendant.).
77
Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC., No. 08-4168, 2012 WL 1299379, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr.
16, 2012) (The court permitted parties to submit informal letters outlining their positions
regarding discovery disputes, without needing to submit formal memoranda.); Raza v. City of
New York, No. 13-CV-3448, 2013 WL 6177392, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013) (The judge
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effective because frequently parties can frame discovery disputes without extensive briefing,
which delays resolution of the disputes until the briefing is completed and the judge is able to
issue a ruling.
Courts also achieved proportionality by ordering that not all discovery be accomplished
at once, but rather, that the discovery be conducted in phases, allowing the parties to focus on the
most important facts relevant to the key issues in the case.78 Similarly, when discovery involved
voluminous document or ESI discovery, judges reduced the costs of reviewing the documents for
relevance and privilege by ordering that the parties employ sampling.79
Frequently, courts demonstrated active case monitoring and management by intervening
as needed to narrow the scope of discovery, promoting a more focused approach to discovery
and reducing burden and cost.80 And, when the demands of their workloads did not permit them

held a “pre-motion” conference with the parties, attempting to resolve the dispute at the
conference without the need for any briefing.).
78
Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (The court
noted that phasing discovery would help to keep it proportional.); Fisher v. Fisher, No. WDQ11-1038, 2012 WL 2050785, at *5 (D. Md. June 5, 2012) (Court narrowed the scope of
discovery initially sought by plaintiff, initiated phased discovery to focus on most important
facts, and informed plaintiff that further discovery would be possible based on the results of the
initial discovery.), Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3(N.D. Ill., Nov.
17, 2010) (The court ordered the parties to meet and confer, to develop a phased discovery
schedule, reminding them of their duty to cooperate in doing so.).
79
Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5, *18
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (In class action antitrust case judge encouraged parties to use sampling
to reduce the cost of discovery of ESI.); Quintana v. Clare’s Boutiques, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-368,
2014 WL 234219, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan 21, 2014) (Judge ordered that plaintiff be permitted
discovery of a statistically significant sample of defendant’s records).
80
Equal Emp’t Opportuity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare System, No. 10-4126, 2011 WL
2148660, at *17 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011) (Court found the temporal scope of plaintiff’s discovery
request was too broad and abstract, narrowing it to a period of six years initially, with the
possibility of an additional four); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-500, 2010 WL 4736295,
at *1 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2010) (Judge granted plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add
another claim, but ruled that that did not “throw open the doors to [unlimited] discovery,” and
imposed “tight restrictions” on the additional discovery on the new claim.).
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to be personally involved in actively monitoring discovery, judges displayed a willingness to
involve others who could, such as a magistrate judge or, if the cost was not excessive and the
need justified the appointment, a special master or other neutral.81 While referrals to magistrate
judges are frequent, appointing a special master is infrequently done because of the expense to
the parties. Alternatively, appointing a technical expert, such as a computer expert skilled in
designing and implementing effective search protocols for large volumes of ESI to assist less
technically sophisticated lawyers or parties can be a very effective use of a third party, because
the cost of the expert frequently is offset by the reduction in cost to the parties by use of the more
efficient and less expensive methods identified by the expert.
As the above examples and those that are discussed below amply show, judges who have
shown a willingness to actively monitor and manage the discovery in their cases (or appoint
another to do it for them) have shown creativity, flexibility, and resourcefulness limited only by
their own ingenuity. The mere knowledge that a judge is willing to make him or herself
available to resolve discovery disputes has a deterrent effect against burdensome or
disproportionate discovery. Lawyers are less likely to initiate disproportionate discovery or
engage in discovery misconduct when they know the judge is watching and willing to be
contacted as soon as a problem arises. It is no surprise, therefore, that when lawyers and
commentators are asked to identify the most important ingredient to ensuring proportional
discovery, they respond: “active management by the trial judge.”82

81

Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 08-4168, 2012 WL 1299701, at *11 (D.N.J. Apr.
16, 2012). (In antitrust case, judge appointed a special aster “to expedite the timely resolution of
any existing or prospective disputes regarding the designation fo discovery” under a previously
entered confidentiality order.); U.S. v. Educ. Mgmt. LLC, No. 2:07-cv-461, 2013 WL 3863963, at
*1-3 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2013) (Judge appointed a retired judge as a special master to resolve and
narrow the discovery disputes raised by numerous motions.).
82
Supra, notes 73 and 74.
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And, importantly, actively monitoring all their cases but intervening to more directly
manage the discovery only for those cases that need it produces great benefits for the judge.
Judges who confer with the parties to make their expectations clear about how discovery is to be
conducted at the start of each case, monitor all their cases and promptly step in to more actively
manage those that require it find that they have fewer disputes, fewer motions to decide, fewer
opinions to write, and more time to devote to their other cases. Active judicial monitoring and
selective management of the discovery in cases that require it makes sense not just because the
rules require it, but because it is entirely within the self-interest of the judge.
2. Encouraging Cooperation among the Parties and Counsel
As noted, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recognized that you may distill what
is needed to achieve the goals of revised Rule 26(b)(1) to two words and a phrase:
“proportionality,” “cooperation” and “sustained, active, hands-on judicial case management.”83
It follows, then, that one of the most effective ways that judges can ensure proportional
discovery is to make sure that counsel and the parties are aware of the benefits of cooperating
during discovery and to encourage them to do so.
While there is little doubt that proportional discovery in a case is not possible in the
absence of cooperation between the parties and their counsel, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not explicitly require cooperation. A duty to cooperate certainly is implicit in the
collective requirements of a number of rules, however. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 stated,
prior to December 1, 2015, that the rules “should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Rule 26(f) requires
the parties to “confer as soon as practicable” to discuss the case and attempt “in good faith to

83

Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-2.
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agree on . . . [a] proposed discovery plan,” which they then must submit to the court in a written
report. Rule 26(g)(1) requires an attorney or party (if unrepresented) to sign every discovery
request, response or objection, and it states that the signature “certifies that to the best of the
person’s knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,” the discovery
request, response or objection is not “unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of
the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues
in the action.” Additionally, Rule 37 provides a significant number of sanctions that a court may
impose for “failure to make disclosures or to cooperate in discovery.”84 And, courts long have
encouraged counsel and parties to cooperate during the discovery process to achieve
proportionality.85

84

While sanctions are available to deter and punish parties who fail to comply with the discovery
rules or orders of the court, judges cannot expect to achieve cooperative discovery through
imposition of sanctions alone. Indeed, the Committee Note to newly amended Rule 1 makes it
clear that the emphasis on cooperation between the parties when they employ the discovery rules
“does not create a new or independent source of sanctions.” Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2015).
While failure to cooperate, standing alone, is not subject to sanctions, it often leads to conduct
that the rules prohibit, which may be sanctionable. Moreover, when cooperation is the goal,
sanctions for conduct that violates the rules are effective when they are a last resort—the “stick”
that is appropriate only when the use of “carrots” to persuade the parties of the mutual benefits of
cooperation has failed. The most effective way to achieve cooperation during discovery is for
the judge to be actively involved in monitoring all phases of the discovery process, and to
educate the parties at the start of each case how it is to their mutual advantage to reduce expense,
delay, and burden by cooperating in the design and execution of focused discovery appropriate
for the needs of the particular case.
85
See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 360 n.3 (D. Md. 2008)
(collecting cases) (“It cannot seriously be disputed that compliance with the ‘sprit and purposes’
of . . . [the] discovery rules requires cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill legitimate
discovery needs, yet avoid seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is disproportionately
large to what is at stake in the litigation. Counsel cannot ‘behave responsively’ during discovery
unless they do both, which requires cooperation rather than contrariety, communication rather
than confrontation.”).
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Furthermore, the 2015 changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include a revision
to Rule 1 and its advisory note to further underscore the importance and value of cooperation.
As explained by Judge David Campbell, Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee:
As already noted, cooperation among parties was a theme heavily emphasized at
the Duke Conference. Cooperation has been vigorously urged by many other
voices, and principles of cooperation have been embraced by concerned
organizations and adopted by courts and bar associations. The Committee
proposes that Rule 1 be amended to make clear that parties as well as courts have
a responsibility to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every
action. The proposed Committee Note explains that “discussions of ways to
improve the administration of civil justice regularly include pleas to discourage
over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and result in
delay. Effective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed depends upon—
cooperative and proportional use of procedure.”86
Toward that goal, revised Rule 1 now states: “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil
actions and proceedings in the United States district courts. . . . They should be construed,
administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” (emphasis added).87 Absent
cooperation between the parties, the court and the parties cannot “employ” the rules of civil
procedure in a manner that fulfills the aspirational goals of Rule 1.
Thus, one of the most effective tools that judges employ to achieve proportional
discovery is to ensure that counsel and the parties are aware of the benefits of cooperation, and to
encourage them to cooperate.88 They do this by exhorting and admonishing the parties to
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Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-13.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (2015); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-21.
88
See, e.g., Thompson v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 12-CV-00391, 2014 WL 595911, at *5-6 (N.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2014); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10C5711, 2012 WL
4498465, at *1, *8-9, *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253
F.R.D. 354, 357-61, 364-65 (D. Md. 2008); Perez v. Mueller, No. 13-C-1302, 2014 WL
2050606, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 19, 2014); SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 246 F.R.D. 403, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
17, 2010); In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
87
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cooperate,89 educating them about the benefits of cooperation and providing examples of how to
cooperate,90 and—in the rare circumstances where education and encouragement have not
worked—reminding them that uncooperative behavior can lead to conduct that the rules do not
permit, which could result in the imposition of sanctions.91 Judges also promote cooperation by
informing the parties about publications that discuss how they can achieve cooperation and the
advantages of doing so.92
3. Adopting Informal Discovery Resolution Methods

89

Thompson v. C. & H. Sugar Co., No. 12-CV-00391, 2014 WL 595911, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
14, 2014) (Court ordered the parties to meet and confer to agree on search methodology for ESI
discovery that it described as “incredibly broad,” and admonished that “this court has
emphasized the importance of the parties cooperating to iron out discovery wrinkles on their
own.”); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am, No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *1,
*8-9, *12 (N.D. Ill Sept. 28, 2012) (magistrate judge assigned to resolve discovery disputes in
contentious antitrust case admonished lawyers on the requirement to cooperate in planning and
executing discovery); In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)
(magistrate judge noted the excessive costs in pending commercial litigation and admonished
counsel regarding the duty to be cooperative in the conduct of discovery and only seek court
intervention in “extraordinary circumstances” involving “significant interests.”).
90
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-61, 364-65 (D. Md. 2008)
(magistrate judge extensively discussed origin of duty to cooperate in discovery to achieve
proportionality, citing Rules 26(g) and Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(1)-(iii), and provided specific guidance
on steps that should be taken to do so.).
91
Perez v. Mueller, No. 13-C-1302, 2014 WL 2050606, at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 19, 2014) (district
judge issued order denying defense motion to dismiss and provided guidance regarding conduct
of discovery, noting that the court was participating in the Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery
Pilot Program, principle 1.02 (Cooperation) of which stated “[t]he failure of counsel or the
parties . . . to cooperate in facilitating and reasonably limiting discovery requests and responses
raises litigation costs and contributes to the risk of sanctions.”).
92
SEC v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 256 F.R.D. 403, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (district judge analyzed
discovery disputes stemming from large volume of ESI sought in discovery, discussed the
obligation of the parties to confer in developing a discovery plan, and drew their attention to the
Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, which urges parties to work in a cooperative
rather than adversarial manner to keep discovery costs from becoming burdensome); Tamburo v.
Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (magistrate judge
required parties to meet and confer to agree on a phased discovery plan, and required them to be
familiar with the Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation.).
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When the parties have discovery disputes that they cannot solve without court
intervention, the filing and resolution of motions to compel, for protective orders, or seeking
sanctions can involve significant time and expense. The ready availability of seemingly limitless
discovery opinions (accessible via internet legal research websites such as Westlaw and Lexis)
means that even the most mundane discovery dispute can involve excessive briefing—with its
attendant costs to the parties. Nonetheless, judges can resolve most discovery disputes with little
or no briefing at all, if the parties notify them of the dispute as soon as it arises, and they swiftly
intervene. Accordingly, one of the most effective tools that judges use to reduce discovery costs
and achieve proportionality is to adopt informal discovery resolution methods that eliminate the
need for formal briefing of disputes.93 Examples of informal discovery resolution methods
include: allowing the parties to submit brief letters outlining the issues, followed by a telephone
conference;94 requiring a “pre-motion” conference with parties to address and attempt informally
to resolve discovery issues without any briefing at all;95 and having informal discovery
conferences (in person or by phone) in lieu of in-court hearings.96
Informal discovery dispute resolution measures can be particularly effective in promoting
proportional discovery, because they permit the judge to intervene in a dispute before it can

93

Indeed, the survey conducted for this thesis of district and magistrate judges indicated that
62% of the district judges had used informal methods to resolve discovery disputes, as did 74%
of the magistrate judges. The cases reviewed also supported the efficacy of informal discovery
dispute resolution methods. See, e.g., Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 08-4168, 2012
WL 1299379, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012); In re Morgan Stanley Mort. Pass-Through
Certificate Litig., No. 09-CV-02137, 2013 WL 4838796, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2013); Raza
v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-3448, 2013 WL 6177392, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013);
Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 09-500, 2010 WL 4736295, at *1 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2010).
94
Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC and In re Morgan Stanley Mortg. Pass-Through
Certificate Litig., supra, note 93.
95
Raza v. City of New York, supra, note 93.
96
Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., supra, note 93.
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escalate to the filing of motions and counter-motions. Further, when the parties know that if they
behave improperly during discovery, they will not be able to do so for long because the judge
will become involved promptly, they have less incentive to adopt delaying tactics such as
making boilerplate objections, filing clearly deficient answers to interrogatories or document
production requests, or misbehaving during a deposition. Moreover, when a judge adopts
informal discovery resolution techniques, he or she can “suggest” resolutions without having to
enter an actual ruling and give guidance on measures the parties can take, focusing on problem
solving, rather than assessing blame or imposing sanctions. And, when a judge makes it clear
how he or she expects the parties to conduct discovery during an informal conference or two,
they soon learn to resolve disputes on their own, by anticipating what the judge is likely to
require and moderating their positions accordingly.
Finally, the use of informal discovery resolution techniques is one of the most effective
ways of making efficient use of a judge’s time. It takes far less time to read a two or three page
letter outlining a discovery dispute and hold a fifteen minute telephone conference than it does to
read a multi-page motion (with memorandum), opposition and reply memorandum, and draft a
formal opinion. And, even a judge with a busy trial docket usually can find thirty minutes to an
hour on any given day before or after trial, or during a lunch recess to address discovery disputes
informally. Thus, judges who adopt informal discovery dispute resolution methods find that they
spend less time addressing discovery disputes and more time on the substantive issues in their
cases.
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has recognized the value of encouraging judges to
adopt informal procedures to resolve discovery disputes to help minimize cost. The 2015
changes to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) gave courts the authority to “direct that before moving for an
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order relating to discovery, the movant must request a conference with the court.”97 The
accompanying Advisory Committee Note explains the rationale for the new language:
The [scheduling] order may direct that before filing a motion for an order relating
to discovery the movant must request a conference with the court. Many judges
who hold such conferences find them an efficient way to resolve most discovery
disputes without the delay and burdens attending a formal motion. . . . 98
Finally, adopting informal procedures to resolve discovery disputes is one of the most effective
ways of implementing active judicial case management because it allows the judge to inject
himself or herself very promptly at the first sign of a discovery problem, and—with a minimum
amount of delay and cost—take action to resolve the problem before it has a chance to spiral out
of control. Because of its efficiency, the judge may use it as frequently as needed to keep a case
on course to achieve proportionality.
4. Phasing Discovery
Judges also may keep costs and burdens in check by ordering that discovery occur in
stages, with the initial phases focusing on the information most likely to be relevant to resolving
the central claims and defenses, with additional phases allowed based on the result of the initial
phase.99 In one case, the court explained in writing the rationale of its prior oral ruling resolving
a series of discovery disputes, and addressed phased discovery as a means to keep discovery
proportional, saying:

97

Fed. R. Civ. P.16(b)(3)(B)(v) (2015); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at
Appendix B-27.
98
Id. at Appendix B-29.
99
See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., No. 10-4126, 2011
WL 2148660, at *11-12 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285
F.R.D. 294, 300-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354,
365 (D. Md. 2008); Bosh v. Cherokee Cnty. Governmental Bldg. Auth., No. 11-CV-376, 2013
WL 6150799, at *2-3, (E.D. Okla. Nov. 22, 2013); Fisher v. Fisher, No. WDQ-11-1038, 2012
WL 2050785, at *5 (D. Md. June 5, 2012); Tamburo v. Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL
4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010).
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I suggested that . . . [counsel] consider ‘phased discovery’, so that the most
promising, but least burdensome or expensive sources of information could be
produced initially which would enable Plaintiffs to reevaluate their needs
depending on the information already provided.100
Judges often order phasing when parties seek discovery covering a long span of time,101 and
ordering phased discovery is a convenient way for a court to achieve proportionality by not
having to issue an “all or nothing” ruling, but rather one that meets the legitimate concerns of
both the requesting and producing party.102 Finally, phasing discovery works best if counsel and
the parties cooperate to identify the information that the requesting party needs most, and
soonest, and which the producing party can obtain from the most readily available sources.
Accordingly, judges who order phasing often remind counsel of the need to cooperate to ensure
selection of the appropriate initial discovery.103
5. Appointment of Judicial Adjuncts
Active judicial monitoring and management of discovery can reduce the amount of time
needed to resolve discovery disputes by nipping them in the bud before they multiply in number
or complexity. However, in the infrequent circumstance where a judge’s schedule prevents
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Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., supra note 99, at 365.
See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare Sys., supra note 99
(Plaintiff in class action discrimination case sought document discovery without any temporal
limits. Citing Rule 26(b)(2)(C), the court found that the request was too abstract and unlimited
and ordered initial discovery for a six year period, advising that depending on the results of the
first phase, additional discovery was possible for an additional three years.).
102
See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman Sachs & Co., supra note 99 (court discussed phasing
discovery as a means of achieving proportionality); Bosh v. Cherokee Cnty. Governmental Bldg.
Auth., supra note 99 (court cited proportionality sections of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) and discussed
how phasing discovery to focus first on a limited number of medical records could achieve it);
Fisher v. Fisher, supra note 99 (court discussed proportionality under all three sub-sections of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C), and imposed phased discovery, informing the plaintiff that additional
discovery would be possible based on the results of the initial discovery).
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See Tamburo v. Dworkin, supra note 99 (court ordered the parties to meet and confer to
prepare a phased discovery schedule and reminded them of the obligation to cooperate in doing
so).
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active monitoring and management of discovery, or where a case is so large or complex that it
requires a great deal of hands-on management that the judge cannot provide without sacrificing
obligations to other cases, the appointment of a “judicial adjunct” such as a magistrate judge,
special master or other neutral to help manage the discovery may be an appropriate tool to ensure
that the discovery is proportional.104 District judges most commonly appoint magistrate judges
when they are unable or unwilling to monitor and manage discovery personally. Magistrate
judges are judicial officers, and involving them does not impose additional expense on the
parties. However, some circumstances may warrant the appointment of a special master, despite
the cost, such as for multidistrict cases, mass tort litigation, large class action cases or especially
complex intellectual property cases. Given the expense involved, Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 requires that
in “appointing a master, the court must consider the fairness of imposing the likely expenses on
the parties and must protect against unreasonable expense or delay.”105 It also prohibits the judge
from appointing a special master except to perform duties with the parties’ consent or that “some
exceptional condition” warrants or to “address pretrial and post-trial matters that cannot be
effectively and timely addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge of the
district.”106
A distinction must be drawn, however, between appointment of a true special master
under Rule 53 to exercise judicial duties and the more frequent practice that some judges employ
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See, e.g., Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLC, No. 08-4168, 2012 WL 1299701, at *11 (D.
N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (In an antitrust case, the judge, faced with a complicated dispute regarding
confidentiality order designations, appointed a special master to “expedite the timely resolution
of any existing or prospective disputes regarding the designation of discovery under the
confidentiality order.); United States v. Educ. Mgmt. LLC, No. 2:07-cv-461, 2013 WL 3863963,
at *1-3 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2013) (district judge appointed a retired judge as a special master to
resolve and narrow discovery disputes raised by numerous motions.).
105
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(3).
106
Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1)(A) and (C).
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of appointing lawyers or experts to assist the parties with resolving discovery-related issues such
as discovery of ESI. While they may be referred to as “special masters” in an informal sense,
they actually are mediators or facilitators and may even be volunteers who provide their services
without cost.
For example, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
has been particularly creative in the use of neutral third parties to resolve discovery disputes
involving ESI.107 Having “determined that litigants in this District may benefit from the
appointment of Electronic Discovery Special Masters (‘EDSMs’) in appropriate cases, in order
to assist in addressing ESI issues that may arise during the litigation,”108 the court developed
criteria for assessing the qualifications of these technical special masters, based on litigation
experience (especially involving ESI), training and experience with computers and technology,
and training and experience in mediation.109 When the parties request, or the presiding judge
determines that it is necessary, the judge appoints an EDSM from a list of pre-approved
candidates and designates the duties to be performed. This may include “developing protocols
for the preservation, retrieval or search of potentially relevant ESI; developing protective orders
to address concerns regarding the protection of privileged or confidential information;
monitoring discovery compliance; [or] resolving discovery disputes.”110 If the EDSM must
make findings of fact or conclusions of law they must be presented to the court in the form of a
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See Electronic Discovery Information, available at www.pawd.uscourts.gov./electronicdiscovery-information (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
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Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
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report and recommendation, with the parties having the opportunity to object, and the court will
review them de novo.111
Appointment of a judicial adjunct to assist a judge in monitoring and managing the
discovery practice in cases where the court lacks the time to do so personally can be very
effective in keeping discovery costs proportional in cases where the substantive issues, discovery
issues, or both, are complex. Because the large dockets that most federal judges have limit the
amount of time that a judge can spend on any single case, those that demand far more judicial
time than most others are potential candidates for the appointment of a judicial adjunct to assist
the trial judge.

6. Cost Shifting
Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are silent about which party must bear the
burden and expense of responding to legitimate discovery requests, the Supreme Court clearly
articulated what has come to be known as “the American Rule,” stating that “the presumption is
that the responding party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests.”112 But
the Court added, importantly, that the responding party “may invoke the district court’s
discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant orders protecting him from ‘undue burden or expense’ in
doing so, including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party’s payment of the costs
of discovery.”113 Thus, cost shifting is an available and appropriate tool for judges to use to
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Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
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guard against the excessive costs and burdens of disproportional discovery requests, and courts
have been willing to use this method, though sparingly, when appropriate.114
One instance in which courts have been willing to order cost shifting is when a party
seeks discovery of ESI “from sources that the [producing] party identifies as not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost.”115 In such circumstances, Rule 26(b)(2)(B) permits
the producing party to refuse to provide the ESI, in which case the requesting party then must file
a motion to compel its production.116 The burden then shifts to the producing party to “show that
the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost,” and if done
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See, e.g., Thompson v. C & H Sugar Co., 12-CV-00391, 2014 WL 595911, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 14, 2014) (Court ordered cost shifting related to costs associated with reviewing and
copying timesheets and payroll data plaintiff sought in employment discrimination case);
Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, No. 4:06CV524, 2006 WL 3825291, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Dec.
27, 2006) (Court approved discovery of ESI on condition that plaintiff incur the costs associated
with creating mirror images of computer hard drives, recovering information from the drives,
and translating it into searchable format); Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-1445,
2011 WL 2154279, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (Court discussed circumstances in which
cost shifting would be justified requiring plaintiff to pay for some or all of the defendants’ costs
in order to achieve proportionality in discovery); Cochran v. Caldera Medical, Inc., No. 125109, 2014 WL 1608664, at *2-3, (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2014) (Court discussed circumstances when
cost shifting would be appropriate, noting that generally it is not unless discovery is sought from
inaccessible sources); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, No. 05-3091, 2009 WL 3446761, at *6
(D.N.J. Oct 20, 2009) (Court discussed proportionality requirement of civil rules and ordered
plaintiff and defendant to share cost of ESI discovery from inaccessible source); Boeynaems v.
LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 338 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (Court observed that asymmetrical
discovery requests made cost allocation fair and appropriate to shift certain discovery costs to
plaintiff); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 317-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Court
discussed when cost shifting was appropriate in connection with discovery dispute regarding
deleted emails, available only from less accessible back-up disks, adopted a widely cited seven
factor test to evaluate cost-shifting); Wiginton v. C.B. Richard Ellis, Inc., 229 F.R.D., 572-77
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (court evaluated proportionality factors and used a “marginal utility” test to
order partial cost shifting with regard to costs of producing emails from back-up tapes, Plaintiffs
ordered to pay 25%, defendants 75%).
115
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
116
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successfully the court may order the discovery from inaccessible sources, but “may specify
conditions for the discovery.”117
When a producing party invokes Rule 26(b)(2)(B) successfully, courts have been willing
to order complete or partial cost-shifting.118 Because discovery of ESI involves particularly great
risks of disproportionality, it is no surprise that courts most often order cost shifting for this type
of discovery.119 Courts also have ordered cost shifting in cases involving “asymmetrical
discovery”—where the requesting party seeks substantial discovery from the producing party,
but has relatively little information that the requesting party seeks in return.120 Courts often
order cost shifting only after determining that the requesting party already has obtained
substantial discovery, but seeks additional burdensome and costly discovery of minimal
relevance.121
Importantly, although courts have not been reluctant to order cost shifting when
necessary to achieve proportional discovery, they have been very mindful that the producing
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See, e.g., Cochran v. Caldera Medical, Inc., supra note 114, at *2-3 (court noted that cost
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Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, supra note 114, at *6 (court ordered plaintiff and defendant to share cost
of discovery of ESI from inaccessible source).
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See, e.g., Ameriwood Indus., Inc. v. Liberman, supra note 114,at *5; Wood v. Capital One
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Major Tours v. Colorel, supra note 114, at *6; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, supra note 114,
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See Wood v. Capital One Sevs., LLC, No. 09-1445, 2011 WL 2154279, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
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party generally must bear the cost of discovery, as stated in Oppeheimer,122 and have not ordered
cost shifting without careful analysis of the particular circumstances justifying it. For example,
in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,123 the court crafted an often-cited seven factor test to determine
when cost-shifting is appropriate when a requesting party seeks ESI from inaccessible, costly and
burdensome sources. Those factors are: (1) the extent to which the request is specifically
tailored to discover relevant information; (2) the availability of such information from other
sources; (3) the total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy; (4) the total cost
of production, compared to the resources available to each party; (5) the relative ability of each
party to control costs and its incentive to do so; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and (7) the relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.124 A court’s
careful consideration of these factors balances the need of the requesting party for the
information, against the burden on the producing party if compliance is required, and it ensures
that the discovery ordered is proportional to what is at issue in the case.
Finally, the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide explicit
authority for cost shifting. Rule 26(c) now states that, in ruling on a motion for a protective
order, the court may order discovery “specifying terms, including time and place or the
allocation of expenses, for the disclosure or discovery.”125
7. Controlling the Scope of Discovery
Once a scheduling order is issued and discovery proceeds, the process generally takes
place without the judge knowing exactly what discovery requests and answers the parties have
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served, unless a dispute arises requiring the court to resolve it. Accordingly, overly-broad or
repetitive discovery requests may impose a significant burden on a responding party if the
requesting party seeks more discovery than reasonably is necessary. This can occur easily
because parties serve document production requests and interrogatories on an adverse party, but
do not file them with the court. Similarly, although the 2015 amendments to the federal rules of
civil procedure narrowed the scope of discovery,126 it long had been broadly defined as
permitting discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or
defense” and, upon a showing of “good cause,” could be expanded to “discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.”127 And, because parties typically file the
most potentially abusive discovery—requests for production of documents and interrogatories—
early in the litigation before they have much knowledge about the underlying facts, there often is
a tendency for counsel to ask for far broader discovery than they are likely to need as evidence if
the case goes to trial. Since requesting parties and producing parties often have radically
different views on the appropriate scope of discovery, it is quite frequent to have disputes about
the proper scope of discovery. When this occurs, one method that courts have used to keep the
discovery proportionate is to narrow the scope of discovery.128
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Prior to the 2015 amendments to the Civil Rules, the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)(1)
allowed a party to obtain information that was not privileged or work product protected, if it was
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” and, thereafter, upon a showing of good cause, the
scope of discovery could be expanded to include information more broadly relevant to the
“subject matter” involved in the litigation. The 2015 revisions to the scope of discovery
permitted by Rule 26(b)(1) eliminates “subject matter” discovery entirely, and limits the scope of
discovery to information “relevant to any party’s claims or defenses.” Judge Campbell
Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-9.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
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See, e.g., Salamone v. Carter’s Retail, Inc., No. 09-5856, 2010 WL 310701, at *12 (D.N.J.
Jan. 28, 2011; Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare System, No. 10-4126,
2011 WL 2148660, at *17 (D.N.J. May 31, 2011); Int’l Paper Co. v. Remax, Inc., No. 11-6494,
2013 WL 3043638 at *7 (D.N.J. June 17, 2013); Barton v. RCI, LLC, No. 10-3657, 2013 WL
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Sometimes courts limit the scope of discovery at the outset, but permit the parties to
obtain additional more expansive discovery based on the results of the initial discovery.129 This
approach has the advantage of encouraging the requesting party to tailor the initial discovery
requests to the information most important to its claim or defense. By doing so, if it later seeks
additional discovery, it will be able to demonstrate to the court that it should be allowed, based
on the relevance of the initial discovery received. This type of sequential, focused discovery is
far more likely to be proportional because it begins with what is clearly the most important
information in the case. However, to persuade the parties not to ask for overly-broad
information at the outset, the judge must convince them that he or she will permit additional
discovery if they target their initial requests more narrowly and justify their requests for more
based on the results of the first requests. In other instances, the judge simply rules that disputed
discovery requests are overbroad, and narrows them without discussing the possibility of
allowing more.130 Thus, courts display a willingness to prohibit cumulative or duplicative

1338235, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2013); Emerson Elect. Co. v. Le Carbone, S.A., No. 05-6042,
2009 WL 435191, at *1-2 (D.N.J. Feb. 18, 2009); Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-500,
2010 WL 4736295 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2010).
129
See, e.g., Salamone v. Carter Retail, Inc., supra note 128 (court permitted the plaintiff to
obtain additional discovery because plaintiff initially had agreed to a more narrow scope of
discovery, and based on the results, additional discovery was permitted because it was not
unduly burdensome); Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Healthcare System, supra
note 128 (court found that temporal scope of plaintiff’s discovery request was too broad and
abstract, narrowing it to a period of six years, but stated that if the results of the initial discovery
warranted additional discovery, plaintiff could seek to obtain discovery for an additional four
years).
130
See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Remax, Inc., supra note 128 (court found that defendant’s
discovery requests sought relevant information, but were “sweeping[ly] broad;” ordered
Defendant to refine and resubmit the requests being “mindful” of the court’s concerns about
scope and proportionality); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Le Carbone, S.A., supra note 128 (citing Rule
26(b)(2)(C), court narrowed the scope of questions to be asked of witness during deposition);
Willnerd v. Sybase, Inc., supra note 128 (court ruled that permission that had been given to
plaintiff to file an amended complaint did not “throw open the doors to . . . [broad additional]
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discovery by narrowing the scope of discovery, and this is particularly so when they find that
“the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information by discovery”
already taken.131
8. Prohibition of “Boilerplate” Objections
When lawyers propound interrogatories and document production requests during
discovery, the party to whom they are directed must file a written response within thirty days.132
Rule 33(b)(4) requires that, if a party responding to an interrogatory objects to it, “the grounds
for objecting . . . must be stated with specificity.” Although, until the 2015 amendments, Rule 34
did not explicitly require that objections to document production requests be stated with
particularity, courts had read that rule as “in pari materia” with Rule 33, to require that
objections to document requests also be stated with particularity.133 The 2015 amendments now
include an explicit requirement to specify the basis for any objection to a document production
request.134 This enables the requesting party to re-evaluate the propriety of the request as
initially served, and to amend it if necessary to be more focused and less burdensome or
expensive. Particularized objections facilitate a cooperative dialogue between counsel and
enable them to revise objectionable requests in response to legitimate objections without adding
to the cost of discovery by requiring the requesting party to file a motion to compel. In practice,
however, it is not unusual for counsel to ignore the obligation to particularize objections, and to

discovery” but ordered that “tight restrictions” were to be imposed on the scope of discovery
appropriate with regard to the newly added claim).
131
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii) (2000).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) (interrogatories) and 34(b)(2)(A) (document production requests).
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See, e.g., Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468, 470 (D. Md. 2005).
134
Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(B) (2015); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at
Appendix B-51 (“For each item or category [requested], the response must either state that the
inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the
grounds for objecting to the request, including the reasons.”).
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respond to each interrogatory and document request with a non-particularized “boilerplate”
objection that it was “overbroad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence.” The absence of an explanation why the request is
objectionable deprives the requesting party of the information needed to determine whether it
can be tailored to avoid a legitimate objection, delays the production of discovery needed to
move the case forward, and usually leads to the filing of a motion to compel, requiring court
resolution of the dispute.
Judges almost uniformly condemn the practice of making boilerplate objections, yet still
they persist.135 For this reason, judges who make it clear to the parties that boilerplate objections
will not be permitted help achieve proportional discovery by preventing an abusive practice that
can add to the cost of discovery and undermine cooperation.136
9. Ordering Sampling of Voluminous Data Sources to Reduce Cost and Burden
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See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md. 2008) (citing
cases that have held that boilerplate objections are inappropriate. The court explained “Rule
26(g) . . . was enacted over twenty-five years ago to bring an end to the . . . abusive practice of
objecting to discovery requests reflexively—but not reflectively—and without factual basis. The
rule and its commentary are starkly clear: an objection to requested discovery may not be made
until after a lawyer has ‘paused and consider[ed]’ whether, based on a ‘reasonable inquiry,’ there
is a ‘factual basis [for the] objection.’”).
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See, e.g., Dawson v. Ocean Twp., No. 09-6247, 2011 WL 890692, at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 14,
2011) (in a police misconduct civil rights case, the court prohibited “generalized” boilerplate
objections, stating “the Court notes that ‘it is not sufficient to merely state a generalized
objection, instead, the objecting party must demonstrate that a particularized harm is likely to
occur if the discovery be had by the party seeking it’”); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co.,
supra note 135; D.J.’s Diamond Imps., LLC v. Brown, No. WMN-11-2027, 2013 WL 134082, at
*2, *4-10 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2013) (“[O]bjections to interrogatories must be specific nonboilerplate, and supported by particularized facts where necessary to demonstrate the basis for
the objection.”); Koch v. Koch Indus., No. 85-1636-C, 1992 WL 223816, at *1, *5, *9 (D. Kan.
Aug. 24, 1992) (“A party will not be able successfully to oppose discovery on bare assertions of
burdensomeness, oppressiveness, or irrelevance . . . . Instead, the resisting party must show
specifically, clearly and factually the basis for its objection . . . . Affidavits or evidence may be
used, and even may be required in some instances, to demonstrate burden.” (internal citations
omitted)).
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In large cases such as class actions, intellectual property cases, Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”) collective actions, and antitrust cases, the volume of information that the parties may
have to review to respond to document production requests can be staggering, especially if the
records to be reviewed are ESI. The costs associated with reviewing a large database of ESI to
see which records within it are relevant, or exempt from discovery because they are privileged or
work product protected, can add significantly to the costs of discovery and create a real risk that
the cost will be disproportionately expensive. In the face of claims of disproportionate cost
associated with discovery from large volume data sets, courts have turned to statistical sampling
as a method to reduce costs, without unduly sacrificing the ability of the requesting party to
obtain relevant information to support its case.137
For example, one court observed that, in a diversity class action case asserting state wage
and hour claims, the defendant had raised legitimate privacy concerns about allowing the
putative plaintiff’s class to have discovery of payroll records of all of its employees. The court
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See, e.g., Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 08-4168, 2011 WL 5416330, at *17
(D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (In resoling discovery dispute in antitrust case, the court ordered the
supplementation of earlier discovery responses by using “limited mutual sampling” of
defendant’s sales force as a means to achieve proportionality); Kleen Prods. LLC v Packaging
Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at *5-6, *15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (In class
action antitrust case court encouraged parties to use sampling to reduce cost and burden of
searching for ESI of low level custodians of records); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285
F.R.D. 294, 304-07 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (In a class action employment discrimination case, court
discussed the benefits of using statistical sampling in connection with document discovery of
ESI database to achieve proportionality); Quintana v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., No. 5:13-cv-368,
2014 WL 234219, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (Court ordered that Plaintiff be permitted
discovery of a statistically significant sample of defendant’s records, noting that such sampling
advances the goal of proportionality); Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. German Sport Guns, GmbH, No.
11-1108, 2014 WL 533270, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2014) (Court ordered parties to confer to
reach agreement regarding appropriate sizeof sample pool of records that defendant was required
to review, in an effort to achieve proportionality); Cranney v. Carriage Servs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv01587, 2008 WL 245792, at *2-3 (D. Nev. June 16, 2008) (Court cited proportionality
requirement in issuing a protective order limiting discovery that defendants could obtain to ten
percent of potential opt-in plaintiffs in FLSA collective action.).
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noted, however, that the plaintiffs had a legitimate need to conduct discovery of the pay records
of the entire putative class to support their claims that the defendant’s allegedly wrongful
policies and practices were common across the class. The court resolved this dispute by
resorting to sampling, ruling that
[t]he right balance is struck by providing Plaintiffs’ discovery of a
statistically significant sample. In the specific context of class action
discovery, sampling advances the goal of proportionality . . . . The court
therefore ORDERS . . . [defendant] to provide a 20% sample of putative
class members’ information but the court leaves it to the parties to work
out the particulars of how the sample is selected (e.g., cluster sampling
stratified sampling, etc.). However, the sampling regime itself may not
serve as a basis upon which to challenge the statistical sufficiency of the
evidence.138
Similarly, in a copyright and trademark case, another court ordered the parties to jointly develop
an appropriate sampling of the defendants’ records, stating:
The Court recognizes that information concerning replica firearms is potentially
relevant to intentional misconduct by . . . [defendants]; however, it is too
burdensome to request a list of all replica firearms, along with licensing
information. The parties must find a way to manage discovery so that it is
meaningful without implementing a scorched-earth policy. To ensure production
of relevant information proportional to the needs of the case, Plaintiffs and
Defendants are ordered to confer on an appropriately sized sample pool of replica
firearms that will satisfy Plaintiffs interrogatory for which Defendants must then
produce any responsive documents.139
An added benefit of using sampling to reduce discovery costs is that if the court orders the
parties to agree on the specific details of how it will be conducted, this promotes cooperation
which also helps to keep discovery costs reasonable. In ordering sampling, however, a court
must take care to require that the selection of the sample is in accordance with sound statistical
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Quintana v. Claire’s Boutiques, Inc., supra, note 137, at *2.
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57

methodology, to ensure that the sample obtained truly is representative of the entire population
of data.
10. Ordering that Discovery be Made from Less Burdensome or Expensive Sources
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit discovery by multiple means:
interrogatories; document production requests; requests to inspect tangible things or to enter onto
land to conduct inspections; depositions (by oral examination and written examination); physical
and mental examinations; and requests for admissions.140 Lawyers are nothing if not inventive,
and desiring to leave no stone unturned, are prone to seek overlapping discovery by multiple
methods. Doing so creates a real possibility of disproportionate costs. Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)
requires the court, on its own, or responding to a motion, to limit the extent of discovery if it
determines that “the discovery sought . . . can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”141 Thus, when faced with a case in which a
party seeks discovery from a source or by a means that is not cost-efficient, courts are not
hesitant to redirect them to less costly or burdensome sources.142
11. Use of Protocols, Standing Orders, or Local Rules that Implement Proportionality
Requirement
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putative class fill out a fact sheet, as opposed to having the plaintiff respond to defendant’s
burdensome interrogatories. After the parties failed to agree about the content of the
questionnaire, the court ordered briefing and ruled that the questionnaire proposed by the
defendant, with modifications, would be answered by the plaintiffs.); Kia Motors Am., Inc. v.
Autoworks Distrib., No. 06-156, 2007 WL 4372954, at *9 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2007) (district judge
affirmed an order by a magistrate judge directing that discovery sought by plaintiff be obtained
in a less expensive and inconvenient manner than plaintiff had requested.).
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As this thesis extensively discusses, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
proportionality in the conduct of discovery. But, in addition to the Rules themselves, many
United States district courts have adopted local rules to supplement the Federal Rules, and
individual district judges have issued standing orders or other directives to refine further how the
parties will conduct discovery in their cases. Authority for local rules and judge’s directives
appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 83. With respect to local rules, Rule 83(a) states that, “[a]fter giving
public notice and an opportunity for comment, a district court, acting by a majority of its district
judges, may adopt and amend rules governing its practice.”143 Local rules “must be consistent
with—but not duplicate—federal statutes and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072[144] . . . and
must conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference of the
United States.” 145 With respect to judge’s directives, Rule 83(b) states:
A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal law, rules
adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s local rules. No
sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for noncompliance with any
requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the local rules unless the alleged
violator has been furnished in particular case with actual notice of the
requirement.146
Thus, local rules and judges’ directives must not be inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Many district courts have enacted local rules that implement the proportionality
requirement in the federal rules by adopting procedures that make discovery more cooperative,
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) grants authority to the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and
courts of appeals.” The adoption of rules pursuant to this statute “shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
145
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a).
146
Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b).
144

59

efficient, and less expensive or burdensome, and by encouraging judges to be available
expeditiously and informally to resolve discovery disputes.147 Others have adopted discovery
guidelines, protocols or pilot projects that further implement the requirements of proportional
discovery.148 Judges frequently call the attention of counsel to local rules, guidelines, pilot
projects and protocols, and by doing so promote proportional, cost-effective discovery.149

See, e.g., D. Mass. R. 26.1(a) (providing that each “judicial officer should encourage cost
effective discovery by means of voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their
attorneys,” such as by exchanging information without the need for formal discovery requests)
and R. 26.3 (promoting “efficient completion of discovery” by authorizing judges to “phase and
sequence topics which are the subject of discovery”); N.D. Cal. R. 37-1(b) (permitting counsel to
request that a presiding judge be available by telephone to resolve a discovery dispute if doing so
“would result in substantial savings of expense or time”) and 37-2 (requiring each motion to
compel to include a showing that “the proportionality and other requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2) are satisfied”); and D. Md. Loc. R., App’x A, Discovery Guideline 1.a. (stating that “
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 requires that discovery be relevant to any party’s claim or defense;
proportional to what is at issue in a case; and not excessively burdensome or expensive as
compared to the likely benefit of obtaining the discovery sought”; adding that “[t]he parties and
counsel have an obligation to cooperate in planning and conducting discovery to tailor the
discovery to ensure that it meets these objectives”).
148
See, e.g., D. Md. Loc. R. App’x A (adopting comprehensive Discovery Guidelines that
explicitly note the requirement for proportional, cost-effective discovery, and the requirement
that counsel cooperate during discovery to achieve it); Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v.
Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., 997 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944 (E.D. Wisc. 2014) (discussing the Seventh
Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program (“Seventh Circuit Pilot Program”), in particular
principle 1.03, which requires application of the proportionality standard to ESI discovery); and
Swanson v. ALZA Corp., No. CV 12-04579-PJH, 2013 WL 5538908, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7,
2013) (court referred counsel to N.D. Cal. Guidelines addressing discovery of ESI which contain
a requirement that it be proportional).
149
See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp of Am., No 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465, at
*3, *6, *18, *19 n.14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012 (magistrate judge ruling on multiple discovery
issues in a class action antitrust case discussed ways to achieve proportionality, including
cooperation among counsel, and informed counsel of the location of various model orders to
assist them in doing so, including reference to the Seventh Circuit Pilot Program); Travelers
Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Cannon & Dunphy, S.C., supra note 148 (Court discussed importance
of proportional discovery, referenced the Seventh Circuit Pilot Program.); Perez v. Mueller, No.
13-C-1302, 2014 WL 2050606, at *7 (E.D. Wisc. May 19, 2014) (court referenced its
participation in the Seventh Circuit Pilot Project, specifically principle 1.03, which requires
proportionality in discovery of ESI); Plascenca v. BNC Mortg., Inc., No. 08-56305, 2012 WL
2161412, at *3, *6, *8, *11 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. June 12, 2012) (bankruptcy judge in adversary
action provided guidance to parties on how to conduct discovery, referring them to local rules of
147
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Similarly, some courts have reduced discovery costs by adopting the use of approved
pattern discovery request forms (especially for interrogatories and document requests) that are
useful for types of frequently filed cases involving similar fact patterns, claims, and defenses.
Examples are adverse-action employment discrimination cases, FLSA cases and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act cases.
Use of pre-approved discovery request forms promotes proportionality by eliminating or
reducing the wrangling that often occurs when parties spar over the appropriateness of discovery
requests, or the clarity of the language used in them. When the requesting party uses courtapproved discovery forms, there will be fewer objections to the form of the requests, because the
producing party knows that the court will not take kindly to objections to the form of requests the
court already has approved.
When individual district courts and judges adopt local rules, guidelines, protocols, pilot
programs and case management directives that further implement the proportionality requirement
of Rule 26(b), and reference them during their case management conferences and in discovery
rulings, they help promote the goals of Rule 26(b) not just in individual cases, but by making the
entire bar practicing before that court aware of the courts’ expectations. Over time, this can
improve the entire culture of how lawyers behave during discovery.
12. Encouraging the Use of Technology to Reduce the Costs of Discovery of ESI
Discovery of ESI can pose particular challenges to achieving proportionality, given the
vast amount of electronic information that may be potentially relevant, even in the most modest
cases. The Rand Corporation has estimated that, of the three primary cost components of ESI

court and discussing proportionality requirement of N.D. Cal. R 37-2.); Swanson v. ALZA Corp.,
supra note 148, at *2 (magistrate judge referenced the N.D. Cal. Discovery Guidelines for ESI
discovery, which require proportionality).
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discovery (collection, processing, and review), $0.73 of each dollar spent is attributed to attorney
review, while only $0.08 is attributed to collection costs, and $0.19 on processing costs.150 Rand
concluded that, “[i]f e-discovery production costs are ever to be addressed in any meaningful
way, then the legal community must move beyond its current reliance on eyes-on review.”151
The technique with the most promise for meaningfully reducing costs of ESI discovery is known
as “computer-categorized review—predictive coding.”152
Predictive coding
is a process by which the computer does the heavy lifting in deciding whether
documents are relevant, responsive, or privileged . . . . [It] automatically . . .
[assigns] a rating (or proximity score) to each document to reflect how close it is
to the concepts and terms found in examples of documents attorneys have already
determined to be relevant, responsive or privileged. This assignment becomes
increasingly accurate as the software continues to learn from human reviewers
about what is and what is not of interest. This score and the self-learning function
are the two key characteristics that set predictive coding apart from the less robust
analytical techniques.153
Rand concluded that, while “[t]here are few published reports of predictive coding in actual
discovery productions that provide sufficiently detailed cost comparisons with human-review
approaches,”154 this new technology holds the most promise for reducing the costs of ESI
discovery.155
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Nicholas M. Pace & Laura Zakaras, Where the Money Goes, Understanding Litigant
Expenditures for Producing Electronic Discovery, 41, Rand Corporation, 2012, available at
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1208.html (hereinafter “Rand Report”).
151
Rand Report, supra note 150, at 59.
152
Id. Predictive coding also is referred to as “computer-assisted review,” Da Silva Moore v.
Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, 287 F.R.D. 182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), or “technology assisted
review” (frequently abbreviated as “TAR”).
153
Rand Report, supra note 150, at 59.
154
Id. at 67.
155
Id. at 66-69.
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Because predictive coding is such a new technology, and the studies of its effectiveness
in reducing ESI discovery costs as compared with traditional attorney-review are still few in
number, it is understandable that parties may be reluctant to adopt its use (and benefit from its
concomitant cost savings) until confident that courts will accept it as an appropriate alternative to
more expensive traditional review procedures.156 Thus, this new technology has not yet played a
prominent role in making ESI discovery costs more proportional. That, however, is beginning to
change, as more courts speak approvingly of the use of predictive coding or TAR.157 As more
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Da Silva Moore v. Publicis Groupe & MSL Group, supra note 152, at 182-83 (The court
began its decision by quoting an article previously written by the judge in which he stated “[t]o
my knowledge, no reported case (state or federal) has ruled on the use of computer-assisted
coding. While anecdotally it appears that some lawyers are using predictive coding technology,
it also appears that many lawyers (and their clients) are waiting for a judicial decision approving
of computer-assisted review.”)
157
Id. at 183 (“This judicial opinion now recognizes that computer-assisted review is an
acceptable way to search for relevant ESI in appropriate cases.”); Hinterberger v. Catholic
Health System, Inc., No. 08-CV-380S(F), 2013 WL 2250603, at *1-3 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (Court
discussed long dispute between plaintiff and defendant over proper method by which defendant
would undertake production of voluminous emails sought by plaintiff. The court noted that it
had suggested to the parties that they confer in an effort to agree on the use of predictive coding
to accomplish the ESI production, and that the parties disagreed on how predictive coding would
be used, but not on the usefulness of the method. The court declined to grant plaintiff’s motion
to compel the defendant to meet and confer with plaintiff to agree on an ESI discover protocol,
because Defendant expressed its willingness to do so, as long as the discussion included
defendant’s desire to use predictive coding to search for ESI.); Dynamo Holdings Lt’d P’ship v.
Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 143 T.C. No. 9, 2014 WL 4636526 (U.S. Tax Ct., Sept. 17, 2014)
(Court overruled Respondent’s request that Petitioners produce ESI on backup tapes or produce
the tapes themselves under a “clawback” agreement that prevented waiver of attorney client
privilege or work product protection. Alternatively, the Court approved Petitioners’ request that
they avoid the need to undertake burdensome and expensive pre-production review of
voluminous ESI to preclude disclosure of privileged or protected information, by using
predictive coding to identify information responsive to the discovery request, as opposed to
document-by-document review. Court extensively discussed how predictive coding worked and
its approval of this method of reducing burden and expense); In re Actos Products Liability
Litigation, MDL No. 6:11-md-2299, 2012 WL 7861249, at *3-8 (W.D. La. July 27, 2012) (Court
approved agreement reached by parties to use predictive coding to search voluminous ESI); Rio
Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., No. 14Civ.3042 (RMB), 2015 WL 872294, at *1-3 (S.D.N.Y. March 2,
2015) (Court noted that predictive coding more recently has been referred to as “technology
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courts approve the use of this promising technology, and more studies demonstrate its
appropriateness, and the savings it can achieve, lawyers and clients will overcome their
reluctance to use it, and the cost of ESI discovery will decline.
At present, parties appear increasingly receptive to using TAR to search for privileged or
work product protected information to prepare a privilege-log as Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5)(a)
requires. However, TAR is just as effective for segregating relevant from irrelevant documents
when reviewing a large set of electronically stored information to find the documents responsive
to a particular production request. Judges can promote proportionality by discussing the benefit
of TAR during case management conferences and by helping parties understand the many ways
in which it can reduce both the cost and time needed to conduct ESI discovery.
13. Evaluate Proportionality by Estimating the Range of Plausible Recovery and Costs of
Discovery
Although some cases filed in federal court do not seek recovery of money damages—
such as those only asking for declaratory relief, or seeking to protect civil rights or freedom of
expression—most cases aim to recover money. For the former, it is not feasible to estimate the
plaintiff’s range of likely recovery if successful, as compared to the foreseeable cost of discovery
to arrive at a “dollar” amount of proportional discovery. For the latter, however, such an
approach may provide a good “thumbnail” estimate of how to limit discovery to that which is
proportional to what is at issue in the litigation. Expressed simply, there is little debate that the
parties should not spend $500,000.00 on discovery to resolve a case where the maximum likely
recovery will not exceed $250,000.00.

assisted review” or “TAR,” noted its growing approval by courts, and approved the TAR
protocol agreed to by parties to assist the search of voluminous ESI.).
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And, while lawyers may feel that they lack sufficient information at the start of a case to
make precise calculations of either the likely recovery or the total cost of discovery, few
experienced lawyers file suit in federal court without some careful thought as to the likely
recovery. If the action is based on diversity jurisdiction, a lawyer cannot file suit in federal court
unless the case meets the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.00 in controversy.158 Similarly, an
attorney asserting a claim must disclose “a computation of each category of damages claimed . . .
[as well as] materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered” as an initial
disclosure that usually is due before formal discovery commences.159 And, most experienced
lawyers can predict the reasonably foreseeable range of discovery expenses, at least of the
discovery that they intend to seek from an adverse party. Estimating the range of likely recovery
if successful and the foreseeable range of discovery expenses provides a useful way for the
parties and the court to assess whether “the burden or expense of . . . proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues,” as Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) requires.
By evaluating likely recovery and foreseeable expense, the court and the parties can
arrive at a “discovery budget” for a particular case. And, courts that take seriously their
responsibility to monitor the discovery in a case to ensure proportionality can assist the lawyers
by suggesting a discovery budget, or directing them to prepare one if they are not willing to do it
on their own. For example, one court approached this task as follows:
I noted during the hearing that I had concerns that the discovery sought by the
Plaintiffs might be excessive or overly burdensome, given the nature of this FLSA
and wage and hour case, the few number of named Plaintiffs and the relatively
158
159

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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modest amounts of wages claimed for each. Because the record before me lacked
facts to enable me to make a determination of overbreadth or burden under Rule
26(b)(2)(C), I ordered counsel to meet and confer in good faith and do the
following. First, I asked Plaintiffs and Defendants each to estimate the likely
range of provable damages that foreseeably could be awarded if Plaintiffs prevail
at trial. In doing so, I suggested that the Plaintiffs assume for purposes of this
analysis that their pending motion to certify a FLSA collective action would be
granted, because doing so allows the parties to gauge the “worst case” outcome
Defendants could face. I then ordered that counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendants
compare these estimates and attempt to identify a foreseeable range of damages,
from zero if Plaintiffs do not prevail, to the largest award they likely could prove
if they succeed. I also asked Plaintiffs’ counsel to estimate their attorneys’ fees.
While admittedly a rough estimate, this range is useful for determining what the
“amount in controversy” is in the case, and what is “at stake” for purposes of Rule
26(b)(2)(C) proportionality analysis. The goal is to attempt to quantify a
workable “discovery budget” that is proportional to what is at issue in the case.160
While estimating foreseeable recovery and discovery expenses to develop a discovery budget
may not be effective in every case, it is a helpful tool for judges to use in those cases where the
plaintiff seeks a money recovery.
14. Capping Time/Money Spent on Discovery
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) requires the court to limit the “frequency or
extent of discovery otherwise allowed” if necessary to achieve proportionality. Courts can do
this by limiting the number of interrogatories, document requests, or depositions that may be
taken, or the amount of time that each deposition may take.161 Similarly, a court can reduce the
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Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008).
Fisher v. Fisher, No. WDQ-11-1038, 2012 WL 2050785, at *5 (D. Md. June 5, 2012) (court
discussed proportionality and expressed disappointment that the failure of the parties to provide
accurate estimates of the amount of time and money already spend on discovery prevented it
from limiting additional discovery by imposing “strict limitations on future discovery in the form
of caps on the amount of time or money that the parties may expend” as a possible way to reduce
cost and expense); Turner v. City of Detroit, No. 11-12961, 2012 WL 4839139, at *1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 11, 2012) (court directed that the deposition of the mayor be limited to two hours to
reduce burden on the defendant); Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 40-42
(D. Md. 2000) (court discussed proportionality requirement, narrowed scope of document
discovery to five year time frame and ordered that amount of time defendant was required to
161
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burden and expense of document discovery by capping the amount of time that the producing
party must spend responding,162 or ordering that the requesting party share all or part of the
costs.163 By imposing numerical or cost limits on discovery, a court can facilitate phased
discovery—requiring the parties to focus first on information most likely to affect the outcome of
the case and conditioning further discovery on a showing that the results of the initial limited
discovery justifies more, given the proportionality factors.
15. Enforcing Rule 26(g)(1) Certifications
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) requires that every discovery disclosure,
request, response or objection must be “signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney’s
own name—or by the party personally, if unrepresented—and must state the signer’s address, email address, and telephone number.” This signature “certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry,” a discovery request,
response, or objection is “neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering
the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance
of the issues at stake in the action.”164 The Rules Committee intended Rule 26(g) to ensure that
parties “engage in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and
purposes of Rules 26 through 37,” and to “provide[] a deterrent to both excessive discovery and

spend searching for responsive documents was limited to 40 hours, permitting plaintiff to seek
additional discovery if plaintiffs paid the actual cost of defendant’s additional search time)
162
Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., supra note 161.
163
Marens v. Carrabba’s Italian Grill, Inc., supra note 161; Zeller v. South Cent. Emergency
Medical Servs., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-2584, 2014 WL 2094340, at *8, *10 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014)
(Court ordered that plaintiff and defendant would share the cost of restoring and searching
plaintiff’s emails, but capped the plaintiff’s maximum contribution to $1,500.00.).
164
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).
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evasion” that “obliges each attorney to stop and think about the legitimacy of a discovery
request, a response thereto, or an objection.”165
This language is very similar to the proportionality language found in Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii).166 Thus, the certification requirement of Rule 26(g) imposes on lawyers and
their clients a duty to consider proportionality in connection with all discovery requests,
responses and objections that they make. The problem is, however, that Rule 26(g) is one of the
“least understood or followed[] of the discovery rules,” and thus in practice has little moderating
effect on the behavior of lawyers and clients during discovery.167 Judges who are aware of the
requirements of Rule 26(g) can insist that the lawyers and parties adhere to it (and thereby
promote proportional discovery), and they can impose sanctions authorized by Rule 26(g) if the
lawyers and parties do not.168
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) Advisory Committee Note (1983).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) states that “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues.”
167
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co. 253 F.R.D. 354, 357 (D. Md. 2008). There is some
mystery about why Rule 26(g)(1) is so little understood, followed, or enforced. Its lack of use
may be attributed in part to its location—it is placed deep within a very long and complex rule,
and is easily overlooked. In addition, although Rule 26(g) (3) requires that a court “must”
impose an “appropriate sanction” on an attorney or party who violates the rule, these sanctions
seldom are imposed by courts. This may be because Rule 26(g)(1) was added to the Rules in
1993, at the same time that changes were made to Rule 11 (which allows sanctions for filing or
maintaining a claim or defense without a sufficient factual or legal basis for doing so) to “[place]
greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions” under that rule, to “reduce the number of
motions for sanctions presented to the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Notes (1993). The
signal to constrain the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions and reduce the number of motions
seeking them that are filed with the courts may have had a concomitant effect on judges’
willingness to impose Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions, despite the fact that Rule 11 “explicitly is
inapplicable to discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).
168
See, e.g., Morris v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., No. 1:10CV388, 2012 WL 5347826, at *4-5
(M.D. N.C. July 9, 2014) (Court addressed obligation of a party to make reasonable inquiry into
factual bases for discovery response, discussing Rule 26(g) and noting that the record “does not
make clear whether Defendant satisfied its obligations” under Rule 26(g).); Cartel Asset Mgmt.
166

68

16. Reducing Discovery Costs through use of Red. R. Evid. 502
Another method judges use to promote proportional discovery involves encouraging the
parties to take advantage of Fed. R. Evid. 502, a remarkably helpful (but far too infrequently
used) rule that can reduce the costs of review and production of ESI substantially.169 Rule 502
can be especially helpful to lower the costs of ESI discovery by eliminating the threat of waiver
of attorney client privilege or work product protection if a party inadvertently produces such
privileged or protected information in response to a document production request.170 To
accomplish this, counsel can enter into non-waiver agreements, such as “clawback” or “quickpeek” agreements, which provide that production of privileged or protected information to an
adversary during discovery does not waive the protection afforded those materials, and the
producing party may demand its return if it did not intend to produce it.171
One of the major purposes of Rule 502 was to

v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644, 2010 WL 502721, at *10, *17-18 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2010)
(Court extensively discussed proportionality requirements and obligations imposed by Rule
26(g), finding that the Defendant failed to comply with those requirements and ordering it to
show cause why sanctions should not be imposed as a result of this failure.); Mancia v.
Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., supra note 167, at 357-61 (court extensively discussed
requirements of Rule 26(g) and how it achieves proportionality, and ordered counsel to take
further steps to comply with the rule).
169
Paul W. Grimm, Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & Matthew P. Kraeuter, Federal Rule of Evidence
502: Has it Lived Up to Its Potential?, XVII Richmond Journal of Law and Technology 2
(2010) (“The enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 . . . in 2008 was intended to provide a
vehicle to reduce the anxiety and costs associated with privilege review, but to date it has not
lived up to its promise. The explanation for why Rule 502 has fallen short may have to do with
the reality that a disappointingly small number of lawyers seem to be aware of the rule and its
potential, despite the fact that the rule is over two years old.”) (hereinafter “JOLT Article”).
170
Fed. R. Evid. 502(b).
171
Fed. R. Evid. 502(e) (providing that non-waiver agreements are binding on the parties to the
agreement), and 502(d) (authorizing a court to order that attorney client privilege or work
product protection is “not waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the
court—in which case the disclosure is also not a waiver in any other federal or state
proceeding”).
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respond[] to the widespread complaint that litigation costs necessary to protect
against waiver of attorney-client privilege or work product have become
prohibitive due to the concern that any disclosure (however innocent or minimal)
will operate as a subject matter waiver of all protected communications or
information. This concern is especially troubling in cases involving electronic
discovery.172
Judges are able to facilitate the costs savings envisioned by Rule 502 by issuing orders pursuant
to Rule 502(d), which states: “A Federal court may order that the privilege or protection is not
waived by disclosure connected with the litigation pending before the court—in which event the
disclosure is also not a waiver in any other Federal or State proceeding.” Issuing a Rule 502(d)
order encourages counsel to enter into non-waiver agreements under Rule 502(e), which then
permits them to forego costly pre-production “eyes-on” review by an attorney or paralegal of
each record that falls within the scope of a document production request. It encourages them
instead to use predictive coding, TAR or other computer assisted review, at much lower cost.173
Critically, the parties cannot achieve the protections against waiver of privilege or work
product protection, and attendant cost savings during ESI discovery, unless they are willing to
enter into Rule 502(e) agreements, and courts are willing to give them the maximum possible
protection by approving the agreement with a Rule 502(d) order.174 Courts that encourage
counsel to enter these agreements and then approve them in a 502(d) order can significantly
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Fed. R. Evid. 502 Advisory Committee Note.
“Rule 502(d) allows federal courts to limit the circumstances in which production of
privileged or protected information constitutes a waiver. In this way, section (d) enables the
courts to advance the goals of Rule 502—reduction of the expense of pre-production review for
privileged and protected information and [adoption of] predictable uniform standards concerning
waiver of privilege or protection—through court orders.” JOLT Article, supra note 169, at 55.
174
See, e.g., John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 837 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (Court found that the
parties had agreed to a “clawback” agreement that permitted the defendants to produce
voluminous ESI without the need to undertake a time-consuming comprehensive privilege
review prior to production. Under the agreement, the Defendant could assert privilege claims
post-production if disclosure of privileged matter was unintentional.).
173
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promote proportionality in discovery where ESI is sought, which occurs with increasing
frequency in contemporary litigation.
17. Imposing Sanctions for Discovery Abuse
Judges have vast authority to impose monetary and other sanctions against parties and
attorneys that violate the discovery rules or abuse the discovery process. Acting in response to a
motion or on his or her own authority, the judge may sanction a party or lawyer who fails to
appear at a scheduling or other pretrial conference, is unprepared to participate in the conference,
or does so in bad faith, or who fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order.175 A judge also may
sanction a lawyer or party that violates Rule 26(g)’s certification requirement before making a
discovery request, objection, answer, or disclosure.176 Rule 37 contains six sub-sections that
permit the court to impose sanctions against a lawyer or party that fails to provide required
discovery; is evasive or incomplete in responding to discovery requests; violates an order
compelling discovery; fails to disclose or supplement an earlier discovery answer or response, or
to admit facts an adversary asks to be admitted; fails to attend its own deposition, serve answers
to interrogatories or respond to a request for inspection; fails to provide requested ESI; or fails to
participate in the framing of a discovery plan.177 The sanctions that the court may impose
include monetary sanctions requiring the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs that the
party improperly denied discovery incurred, as well as the so-called “case dispositive” sanctions
such as directing the fact-finder to take designated facts as established; prohibiting a disobedient
party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated

175

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
See discussion supra at pages 66-68; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3); Branhaven, LLC v. Beeftek,
Inc., 288 F.R.D. 386 (D. Md. 2013) (court imposed sanctions for egregious violations of Rule
26(g) certifications).
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37.
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matters into evidence; striking pleadings (in whole or part); dismissing the action (in whole or in
part); rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or treating the failure to obey a
discovery order as a contempt of court.178 Furthermore, a judge has inherent authority, upon a
finding of bad faith or willful violations of the discovery rules, to impose monetary and other
sanctions.179 Finally, Congress has authorized courts to sanction an attorney who unreasonably
and vexatiously multiplies the proceedings in a case.180
Despite this broad authority to sanction, judges properly are cautious in exercising it
without a substantial justification. This is because discovery works best and most proportionately
when the parties participate in the process cooperatively. Once one party seeks sanctions against
another, the ability to initiate or maintain a cooperative approach becomes difficult, if not
impossible. When faced with improper conduct during discovery the most effective thing a
judge can do is to become more directly involved in managing the process, issuing clear orders
as to what is expected, and informing the parties and counsel that—if disobeyed—sanctions may
be imposed, then reminding them of the importance (and benefits) of cooperating in discovery.181
Such a “carrot and stick” approach works better than indiscriminate imposition of sanctions
every time a party or lawyer fails to fulfill a discovery obligation or comply “to the letter” with a
court order. Further, once a judge imposes sanctions, this actually can work against keeping
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
Paul W. Grimm, Charles S. Fax, & Paul Mark Sandler, Discovery Problems and Their
Solutions, 331 (3d ed. 2013).
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28 U.S.C. § 1927.
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See, e.g., Dongguk University v. Yale, 270 F.R.D. 70, 80 (D. Conn. 2010) ( In issuing orders
addressing significant discovery violations the judge cautioned “[c]ounsel are on notice that
failure to comply with court orders may result in sanctions including, but not limited to, costs
and fees, preclusion of evidence or causes of action, and appropriate sanctions up to and
including dismissal of the case or entry of default judgment”, but added “[t]he Court hopes that
counsel can work cooperatively to conduct discovery efficiently and minimize the expense and
inconvenience to both parties.”).
179

72

costs proportionate, if doing so undermines cooperation, or emboldens the party that was not
sanctioned to look for further opportunities to discredit an adversary by filing more discovery
sanction motions. Thus, sanctions remain a useful tool for achieving proportionality when
appropriate, but are best used sparingly, and only when there are no other viable options and the
misconduct is extreme.
C. Factors that Increase the Likelihood of Disproportionate Discovery
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the answer to the question “Is it possible for
judges to manage discovery to ensure that it is proportional?” is an unqualified “Yes.” Abundant
tools exist for judges to use to achieve this important goal. Having discussed these tools, the final
analysis necessary to appreciate fully how best to achieve proportional discovery is to identify
the “risk factors” or “red flags” that indicate that a judge should intervene to ensure that
discovery does not spiral out of control. In this regard, Rule 26(f) requires the parties to “confer
as soon as practicable,” but no later than, twenty-one days before a scheduling conference with
the presiding judge.182 Rule 16(b), in turn, requires the presiding judge to issue a scheduling
order after having received the parties’ Rule 26(f) report, or “after consulting with the parties’
attorneys and any unrepresented parties at a scheduling conference.”183 Rule 16(b) previously
permitted the judge to consult with the parties (if unrepresented) or their attorneys at a face-toface scheduling conference, “or by telephone, mail, or other means,” but this later language was
eliminated by the 2015 changes because the Advisory Committee believed that “[a] scheduling

182

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1)(B). Rule 16 permits courts to exempt certain categories of cases that
are unlikely to involve discovery (such as social security disability matters, habeas corpus
petitions, forfeitures, and reviews of certain administrative actions) from the requirement that the
court issue a scheduling order or consult with the parties before issuing a scheduling order. See,
e.g., Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (1983).
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conference is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct simultaneous
communication. The conference may be held in person, by telephone, or by more sophisticated
electronic means.”184 It is at this initial scheduling conference with the attorneys (or
unrepresented parties) that the judge is in the best position to evaluate whether there are risk
factors for disproportionate discovery, and discourage them.185 As with the tools that judges use
to achieve proportionality, identifying the risk factors that threaten cost-effective discovery also
involves common-sense considerations. The key is to do so early on, then monitor each case as it
progresses, intervening as necessary to keep costs proportional.
1. Complex Cases
It does not require Napoleonic insight to realize that complex cases pose greater risks of
disproportionate discovery than those that are not. An antitrust case will be more complex than a
diversity jurisdiction automobile tort case. The key is for a judge to realize the types of cases
that most frequently cause discovery disputes, and to monitor those cases carefully to minimize
this possibility. The research done for this thesis showed that securities fraud cases,186 class
actions,187 trademark, patent and other intellectual property cases,188 commercial disputes,189
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Advisory Committee Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), as amended effective December 1, 2015;
see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at Appendix B-27.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3).
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See, e.g., SEC v. Collins, 256 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re Morgan Stanley Mortg.
Pass-Through Certificate Litig., No. 09-CV-02137, 2013 WL 4838796 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11,
2013).
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See, e.g., John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); In Re Morgan Stanley
Mortg. Pass-Through Certificate Litig., supra note 186; Ingersoll v. Farmland Foods, Inc., No.
10-6046-CV, 2011 WL 1131129 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 28, 2011).
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See, e.g., Heckler & Koch, Inc. v. German Sport Guns, GmbH, No. 11 -1108, 2014 WL
533270 (S.D. Ind. Feb, 7, 2014) (trademark); Nola Spice Designs, LLC v. Hayden Enters., No.
12-2512, 2013 WL 3974535 (E.D. La. Aug. 2, 2013) (trademark); Sprint Commc’ns Co. v.
Comcast Cable Commc’ns, No. 11-2684, 2014 WL 1794552 (D. Kan. May 6, 2014) (patent).
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See, e.g., Performance Sales & Mktg. v. Lowes Cos., No. 07- -140, 2012 WL 4061680
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 14, 2012) (commercial dispute); In re Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D.
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trade secrets litigation,190 and multi-district litigation191 frequently have discovery disputes that
can lead to disproportionate discovery costs. This suggests that judges assigned these types of
cases should hold face-to-face scheduling conferences with the parties to discuss how to keep
costs proportional, followed by monitoring to ensure further direct court involvement if needed.
2. Cases Where ESI Discovery is Sought
As the discussion of techniques that judges use to achieve proportionality demonstrated,
there are many challenges associated with ESI discovery that can lead to disproportionately high
costs. Given the ever-increasing variety of digital devices parties use, their tendency to use
multiple devices (desktop computer, laptop computer, tablet, smart phone), and the seemingly
endless storage capacity available on computers, removable storage devices (“zip drives” or
external hard drives) and in the “cloud,” it is easy to see that a request to discover ESI “related”
to a litigation event can involve unimaginably large amounts of data. The costs associated with
reviewing ESI to locate what information must be produced, and implementing and monitoring a
litigation hold to prevent spoliation or loss of ESI can be enormous. And, as the discussion
above about the use of TAR and non-waiver orders pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 502 illustrates, ESI
discovery can complicate a case and result in disproportionately high costs. For these reasons,
cases where parties seek extensive ESI can create a greater risk of burdensome costs,192 and

328 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (large commercial case characterized by court as involving “economic
combat”).
190
See, e.g., Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644, 2010 WL 502721 (D.
Col. Feb. 8, 2010) (misappropriation of trade secrets).
191
See, e.g., In re Actos Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 11-2299, 2012 WL 7861249
(W.D. La. July 27, 2012) (multi-district products liability).
192
See, e.g., SEC v. Collins, 256 F.R.D. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (ESI discovery estimated to
involve in excess of 1.7 million documents); David v. Signal, No. 08-1220, 2010 WL 2723180
(E.D. La. July 6, 2010) (ESI discovery, including email); Wood v. Capital One Servs., LLC, No.
5:09-CV-1445, 2011 WL 2154279 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2011) (Review costs associated with ESI
discovery estimated to exceed $5 million); Klein Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10
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judges who actively monitor their cases to ensure proportional discovery are well served by
addressing these issues early in the discovery process. By doing so, the judge can discuss cost
saving measures such as using Rule 502 non-waiver orders, employing TAR to reduce the cost of
ESI review, sampling, and phased discovery. Also, where a party seeks ESI from inaccessible
sources, the judge can discuss cost-shifting.
3. Cases Involving Excessive Client Animosity
Nearly all litigation involves client animosity to some degree, as the events that lead to
lawsuits seldom have benign effects on the parties. In most cases, the lawyers are able to manage
their clients so that the animosity does not get out of control, and they can initiate discovery for
legitimate information gathering purposes, rather than to impose burden, cost, or to harass an
adversary. Indeed, Rule 26(g)’s certification requirement prohibits initiation of discovery
requests or serving discovery objections or responses for such improper purposes.193 However,
there are instances where client animosity exceeds the ability (or willingness) of the lawyers or
parties (particularly if self-represented) to control it, where the judge must intervene to prevent
the use of discovery for improper purposes. If the judge fails to do so, the costs of discovery can

C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012) (ESI discovery sought, leading to dispute
regarding search methodology); Thompson v. C & H Sugar Co., No. 12-CV-00391, 2014 WL
595911 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2014) (Involving dispute over search terms to be used for ESI
discovery); In re Biomet M2a Magnum Hip Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 3:12-MD-2391,
2013 WL 1729682 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2013) (ESI discovery sought, estimated 2.5 million pages
and costs of $1-3 million involved); Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (Millions of pages of ESI sought by plaintiff during discovery); John B. v. Goetz, 879
F. Supp. 2d 787 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (ESI discovery sought, estimated 15 million pages involved);
Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 868 F. Supp. 2d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (ESI sought, court discussed
the use of TAR to achieve proportional costs given extensive ESI demanded by plaintiffs);
Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (extensive
issues associated with ESI discovery presented to the court for resolution); and Hopson v. Mayor
& City Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228 (D. Md. 2005) (many ESI discovery issues required
court resolution).
193
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(ii).
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escalate as repetitive disputes blossom into filing endless discovery motions, discovery demands
seek information that is outside the scope of permissible discovery, or legitimate discovery
requests are met with frivolous, boilerplate objections and refusals to produce requested
information.194
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See, e.g., Kleen Products v. Packaging Corp., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL 4498465 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 28, 2012) (antitrust class action case marked by client animosity and characterized by
uncooperative discovery leading to many discovery disputes requiring court intervention); Best
Sign Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, No. 09-5244, 2012 WL 4505996 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2012) (Case
involving allegations that former employee violated non-disclosure of confidential information
agreement, discovery disputes reflective of client animosity); Oseman-Dean v. Ill. State Police,
No. 11 C 1935, 2011 WL 6338834 at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2011) (Employment discrimination
case where client animosity resulted in seven separate discovery hearings and, despite court
urging, the plaintiff “resisted any significant narrowing [of her discovery requests] requiring the
court to conduct hearings on the parties’ disputes about almost every one of plaintiff’s many
discovery requests.”); Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ., 270 F.R.D. 70, 80 (D. Conn. Aug 17, 2010)
(Litigation between two universities over alleged failure to verify credentials of art history
professor allegedly leading to “destruction” of plaintiff university’s reputation and its public
humiliation and “deep shame.” In resolving numerous discovery disputes court had to admonish
counsel that failure to comply with court orders could result in sanctions); D.J.’s Diamond Imps.
v. Brown, No. WMN-11-2027, 2013 WL 1345082, at *1, 4 (D. Md. Apr. 1, 2013) (Case alleging
tortious interference with contracts based on allegations that defendant used “threats of physical
harm, intimidation and unfulfilled promises” to interfere with plaintiff’s contract rights resulted
in acrimonious discovery disputes, for which court imposed sanctions.); Cleversafe, Inc. v.
Amplidata, Inc., No. 11 C 4890, 2014 WL 2609654 at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11, 2014) (Court
characterized case as a “complicated and highly adversarial patent case” where both plaintiff
and defendant accused each other “of manipulation and gamesmanship” during conduct of
discovery.); Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010)
(Copyright, patent infringement and unfair competition suit characterized by extreme client
animosity and involved purposeful violation of discovery orders by defendant, resulting in
sanctions for discovery misconduct, including purposeful spoliation of evidence); Maxtena, Inc.
v. Marks, 289 F.R.D. 427, 434-5 (D. Md. 2012) (Contract dispute where client animosity resulted
in discovery disputes requiring court intervention. Court observed that “[h]ampered by their
long history of mistrust and a quickly deteriorating relationship between their attorneys, neither
party presents a truly reasonable view of the proper scope of . . . [contested ]financial valuation”
discovery.); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 97-2600, 2008 WL 1757929 (D. N.J.
Feb. 27, 2008) ((Decade long case fueled by plaintiff’s animosity led to large number of
discovery disputes and court findings of abusive discovery tactics.); Heckler & Koch, Inc. v.
German Sport Guns, GmbH, No. 1:11-cv-1108, 2014 WL 533270 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2014) (Party
animosity led to filing of more than 40 discovery motions requiring court resolution); and In re
Convergent Tech. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (Court observed how discovery in
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When a court becomes aware that excessive client animosity is at play, prompt
intervention can prevent the case from spiraling out of control, resulting in disproportionately
high discovery costs. For example, the court can prohibit parties from filing discovery motions
until after participating in a telephone or in-person conference with the judge, impose page
limitations and reduce time deadlines for briefing discovery motions, require phased discovery
that conditions future discovery on the results of more narrow initial discovery, discuss (and
where appropriate impose) cost shifting, and, where warranted, impose sanctions. Further,
judges who conduct in person or telephonic discovery conferences with the parties are in a
position to gauge the relationship between them, and to make clear at the outset their expectation
that the parties will cooperate during the conduct of discovery, as well as to make clear the
consequences of improper discovery behavior.
Finally, in cases where there is excessive client animosity, and the clients are represented
by counsel, the judge can order the clients themselves to be present in court or chambers when
discovery issues are being discussed or disputes decided. Hearing a judge’s comments can be a
valuable way to make sure that the clients themselves hear and understand the court’s views (and
the consequences of disregarding them). This is particularly useful if the judge suspects that the
lawyers are not really trying to control client animosity or are even generating more billable time
by encouraging it.
4. Cases Involving Attorney Animosity, Misconduct, Over-Zealousness or Over-Aggressiveness
As where there is excessive client animosity, when counsel behave over-zealously, overaggressively or engage in other litigation misconduct, discovery costs and burdens can become

large commercial case was “perverted into an arena for economic power plays” and degenerated
into “irresponsible, unethical, and unlawful” conduct.).
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disproportionate.195 While lawyers have an ethical responsibility to act as advocates for their
clients, which includes the “use of legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause,”
there is a concomitant duty “not to abuse legal procedure.”196 Further, both substantive and
procedural law “establish[] the limits within which an advocate may proceed”197 (which includes
the discovery rules). And, while some lawyers attempt to justify misconduct during discovery as
something that the adversary system requires, this is a flawed view of that system. As one court
has observed:
A lawyer who seeks excessive discovery given what is at stake in the litigation,
or who makes boilerplate objections to discovery requests without particularizing
their basis, or who is evasive or incomplete in responding to discovery, or
pursues discovery in order to make the cost for his or her adversary so great that
the case settles to avoid the transaction costs, or who delays the completion of
discovery to prolong the litigation in order to achieve a tactical advantage, or
who engages in any of the myriad forms of discovery abuse that are so
commonplace is . . . hindering the adjudication process, and making the task of
the “deciding tribunal not easier but more difficult,” and violating his or her duty
of loyalty to the “procedures and institutions” the adversary system is intended to

See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Princeton Hesalthcare Sys., No. 10-4126,
2012 WL 1623870 (D.N.J. May 9, 2012) (Overzealous advocacy of counsel contributed to
discovery disputes and costs.); Cartel Asset Mgmt. v. Ocwen Nin. Corp., No. 01-cv-01644, 2010
WL 502721 (D. Col. Feb. 8, 2010) (Contentiousness of the litigation was caused in part by the
failure of counsel to comply with discovery obligations imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).);
Cleversafe, Inc. v. Amplidata, Inc., No. 11 C 4890, 2014 WL 2609654 at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 11,
2014) (Highly adversarial conduct by counsel characterized by reciprocal claims of manipulation
and gamesmanship during discovery that court had to resolve.); Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 868
F. Supp. 2d 137 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Discovery disputes and costs fueled in part by over-aggressive
conduct of counsel); Summerfield v. City of Chicago, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(Court commented on improper discovery conduct of counsel.); and Maxtena, Inc. v. Marks, 289
F.R.D. 427 (D. Md. 2012) (Animosity between counsel contributed to filing of multiple
duplicative motions, needlessly driving up cost of litigation.).
196
Ellen J. Bennett, Elizabeth J. Cohen & Martin Whittaker, Annotated Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 309 (7th ed. 2011) (citing Comment 1 to Model Rule 3.1, Meritorious
Claims and Contentions).
197
Id.
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serve. Thus rules of procedure, ethics, and even statutes make clear that there are
limits to how the adversary system may operate during discovery.198
Judges who take seriously the duty to ensure proportional discovery can act in many
ways to guard against discovery abuse at the hands of misbehaving lawyers. As noted in the
discussion above, they can adopt local rules, standing orders, protocols and guidelines that set
forth expectations for conduct of counsel during discovery; they can encourage cooperation
between counsel during discovery; and they may sanction lawyers for violating Rule
26(g)(1)(B)’s certifications requirements or impose monetary sanctions against a misbehaving
attorney pursuant to Rule 37. Further, by making the court’s behavioral expectations for counsel
known at the initial scheduling conference, adopting informal discovery dispute resolution
methods and holding conferences in person or by phone during the discovery process, they can
detect attorney misconduct as soon as possible after it becomes manifest and intervene before it
gets out of control.
5. Litigation Involving Pro Se Parties
When one or more parties in federal litigation are proceeding without an attorney (pro
se), the likelihood of increased discovery costs and risk of disproportionate discovery increases
substantially. This is because pro se litigants seldom have legal training, are less likely to
understand (or even read) the discovery rules, often are emotionally invested in their case, and do
not regard themselves as officers of the court who have obligations beyond the advancement of
their own goals. Pro se litigants are more likely to seek overly broad discovery from their
adversaries and less likely to fully comply with their discovery obligations that the rules
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Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362-63 (D. Md. 2008) (internal
citations omitted) (referencing Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:
Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162, 1216 (1958)).
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impose.199 Cases involving pro se litigants also are far more likely to require disproportionately
greater involvement by the court to keep discovery from spiraling out of control. Accordingly,
judges should bear this in mind from the very beginning of the case and initiate procedures that
will allow the court to monitor the discovery process and intervene as quickly as possible when
necessary. Such procedures may include frequent status conferences (in person or telephonic),
informal procedures to resolve discovery disputes (such as pre-motion conferences, and limiting
discovery motions to brief “letter motions”), and requiring that the parties conduct depositions in
a courtroom so that if disputes arise, the judge can rule on them immediately.
6. Cases Involving Issues of Spoliation of Evidence
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See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Dutchman Enters., LLC, No. 09-141, 2010 WL 3034521 at *1, *3, *7
(D.N.J. Aug. 2, 2010) (In an action for deceptive marketing practices, the FTC sued a
corporation and its president (individually). The president represented himself, the corporation
was unrepresented. The court noted that the defendants failed to provide Rule 26(a)(1)
disclosures and failed to respond to legitimate discovery requests from the FTC, claiming that
they were operating under “handicaps” because they were not represented by counsel. The court
ruled that “[d]efendants’ alleged time and resource handicaps resulting from their pro se status
cannot relieve them of their obligations” under the discovery rules and ordered them to provide
the information requested. In doing so, the court rejected “[d]efendants continuous assertion that
they have been unable to review all of their documents and records due to the fact that they are
proceeding pro se” and ordered further review and production of requested records. Finally, the
court rejected the defendants’ objections to discovery requests from the FTC based on the failure
of the defendants to seek a protective order, and failure to particularize any harm that would
occur if the discovery was provided.); N’jie v. Cheung, No. 09-919 (SRC), 2010 WL 3259793, at
*1-9 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 2010) (Pro Se plaintiffs sued defendant (who was represented) alleging
multiple causes of action relating to alleged breach of an option-to-buy clause in a lease
agreement. Multiple discovery disputes arose due to failure of plaintiffs to comply with the
scheduling order issued by the court, file status reports as required, or respond to legitimate
discovery requests from the defendant, all of which required the court to hold multiple status
conferences, concluding “this matter has proceeded in an unacceptably slow fashion and the
Court has no confidence that the parties will resolve the outstanding issues or be able to move
forward without judicial intervention.” Although the court concluded that the plaintiffs still had
many unfulfilled discovery obligations, it found that extending the time to complete discovery
would not be fruitful because of the inability of the parties to work with one another.
Accordingly, the court entered an order closing fact discovery.).
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“Spoliation is destroying, significantly altering, or failing to preserve property for
another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation.”200 The duty to
preserve evidence commences when a party “is on notice that evidence is relevant to pending
litigation, or when it should have known that evidence would be relevant to future litigation.”201
Spoliation issues can be particularly troublesome when ESI is not preserved, because “[o]nce a
party’s duty to preserve is triggered, it must take action to prevent the loss of evidence by, inter
alia, suspending its routine document retention or destruction policy and implementing a
litigation hold.”202 The purpose of a litigation hold is to “preserve paper and electronic
documents in a manner that allows relevant documents to be collected and searched; the hold’s
obligations must be communicated to employees without over-relying on employees to select
responsive documents.”203
If a party fails to preserve evidence that is relevant to pending or foreseeable litigation,
courts “have the power to sanction litigants for spoliation of evidence under . . . [Fed. R. Civ. P.]
37(b) and under their inherent authority to control litigation,” provided the court finds that the
failure to preserve was accompanied by a level of culpability that, depending on the law of the
jurisdiction that governs the litigation, ranges from “bad faith/knowing destruction, gross
negligence . . . [to] ordinary negligence.”204 Similarly, sanctions that courts may impose for
spoliation range along a continuum from awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, ordering that certain
facts are to be taken as having been proved, precluding the introduction of evidence, giving the
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Paul W. Grimm, Charles S. Fax & Paul Mark Sandler, Discovery Problems and Their
Solutions 382 (3d ed. 2013).
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Id. at 383.
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Id. at 384.
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Id. at 384-85.
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jury an adverse inference instruction, to case-dispositive sanctions (such as dismissal, default,
and striking pleadings, claims or defenses).205 Courts generally will refrain from imposing the
most serious spoliation sanctions, however, unless there are “extraordinary circumstances” such
as extreme culpability, and the irreparable loss of highly relevant evidence that a party cannot
obtain from other sources.206
Prior to the December 1, 2015 Rule amendments, the law of spoliation as it applied to the
discovery process varied widely, depending on the jurisdiction where the action was pending.
This caused great uncertainty among litigants as to what standard they would have to meet to
avoid sanctions.207 The new revisions to the civil rules, however, adopted a uniform national
standard applicable to the duty to preserve ESI in civil cases, currently found in Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(e), which states:
If electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the
anticipation or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take
reasonable steps to preserve it, and it cannot be restored or replaced through
additional discovery, the court:
(1) upon finding prejudice to another party from loss of the information, may
order measures no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice; or
(2) only upon finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party
of the information’s use in the litigation may:
(A) presume that the lost information was unfavorable to the party;
(B) instruct the jury that it may or must presume the information was
unfavorable to the party; or
(C) dismiss the action or enter a default judgment.208
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Id. at 385.
Id. at 385-86.
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“Federal circuits have established significantly different standards for imposing sanctions or
curative measures on parties who fail to preserve electronically stored information. These
[different standards] have caused litigants to expend excessive effort and money on preservation
in order to avoid the risk of severe sanctions if a court finds they did not do enough.” Advisory
Note to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (2015); see Judge Campbell Memorandum, supra note 26, at
Appendix B-58.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) (2015).
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The presence of spoliation issues in a civil case can increase the cost and burdens of
discovery dramatically, leading to disproportionate discovery. This is because ESI can so readily
be deleted, over-written, altered, destroyed, or lost when new digital devices replace outdated
hardware or software. When one party accuses another of spoliation of evidence in a civil case,
this almost inevitably leads to requests to expand discovery to focus on the circumstances
leading to the loss of the information, the state of mind of the party that failed to preserve it, and
whether the lost or destroyed evidence may be recovered (from examination of back-up sources,
or forensic examination of digital devices). Such expanded discovery can increase the cost of
discovery exponentially, lead to complex motions practice, and consume a significant amount of
the court’s time to resolve.209 Courts can mitigate the adverse consequences of spoliation issues
in discovery by holding in-person or telephonic conferences with counsel at the start of a case,
discussing the duty to preserve in those conferences, and directing the parties to confer regarding
steps that they should take to ensure appropriate preservation of essential evidence,210
particularly ESI.
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See, e.g., Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497 (D. Md. 2010) (Failure
of defendant to preserve evidence and spoliation issues pervaded the litigation, significantly
increasing the cost, consuming the resources of the court and resulted in imposition of severe
sanctions, including contempt of court.); Rimkus Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F.
Supp. 2d 598 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (Spoliation issues led to many discovery disputes and consumed
significant amount of the court’s time to resolve); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D.
309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Spoliation issues contributed greatly to complexity of discovery, costs and
disputes requiring court resolution.); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587 (D. N.J.
2010) (Spoliation issues complicated conduct of discovery.); Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (Spoliation issues complicated the conduct
of discovery.).
210
For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2015) permits the court to include in a
scheduling order requirements providing for “preservation of electronically stored information,”
and Rule 26(f)(3)(C)(2015), which governs the discovery plan that the parties are to submit for
approval to the court after they have met and conferred at the beginning of the case, “must state
the parties’ views and proposals on . . . any issues about . . . preservation of electronically stored
information, including the form or forms in which it should be produced.”
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In appropriate cases, where it is evident from the start that there may be issues about the
preservation and production of ESI, the court may find it helpful to order that an IT
representative or ESI discovery vendor representative for each party be present at one or more
discovery conferences. ESI preservation and spoliation issues are by their nature very technical.
Lawyers and clients may not be sufficiently knowledgeable about the technological issues in the
case to make properly informed decisions about what should be done for this discovery. Having
technical experts present in these circumstances can promote proportionality by identifying the
appropriate preservation and production procedures and tailoring them to the needs of the
particular case so that cost and burden is kept under control.
Further, at the first hint of a preservation problem, the court can intervene to ensure that
any spoliation-related discovery is appropriate for the pending case, and prevent it from
becoming the sole focus of the case at the expense of developing the substantive issues that will
affect its resolution.
7. Cases Involving Asymmetrical Litigation
In cases where the parties each have similar amounts of information potentially subject to
discovery, each party is less likely to initiate excessive or burdensome discovery requests, for
fear that the opposing party will respond in kind. The threat of “mutually assured destruction”
operates to moderate discovery requests at the outset. This is not the case in litigation where one
party has significantly less discoverable information than the other, and the party with the lesser
amount may be tempted to serve overly broad and expensive discovery requests on an opponent
without fear of retaliation. Examples of such cases can include employment discrimination cases
(where the plaintiff may have relatively little information subject to discovery as compared to the
defendant company that took the allegedly adverse action), products liability cases (where the
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plaintiff seeks discovery of massive amounts of information from the defendant regarding the
development and marketing of the allegedly defective product, while having comparatively little
information that the defendant will require in discovery), FLSA cases (where the defendant has
most of the evidence regarding hours worked and wages paid), civil rights cases, and consumer
fraud cases.
When one party in a case has little information but wants much from its adversary, the
chances of disproportionately burdensome or expensive discovery increase greatly.211 When this
occurs, courts can intervene to mitigate the burden and expense by employing the techniques
discussed above, including phasing discovery, use of sampling, TAR or computer-assisted
review, and, where necessary and warranted, cost allocation or shifting to the requesting party.
D. Implications of the Case Analysis
As the cases have revealed, federal judges display a remarkable degree of flexibility and
ingenuity in using more than a dozen distinctly identifiable methods of managing discovery
(alone or in combination) to balance the need of the requesting party against cost to the
producing party, while taking into consideration what is at stake in the litigation. This is

See, e.g., Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 2012). (In a
class action consumer fraud case, the court found that the discovery requests were asymmetrical
and to prevent against excessively burdensome and costly discovery from the defendant allocated
discovery costs to the plaintiff rather than defendant. The court noted that “[t]he Court is
persuaded, it appearing that Defendant has borne all of the costs of complying with Plaintiffs’
discovery to date, that the cost burdens must now shift to Plaintiffs, if Plaintiffs believe that they
need additional discovery. In other words, given the large amount of information Defendant has
already provided, Plaintiffs need to assess the value of additional discovery for their class action
motion. If Plaintiffs conclude that additional discovery is not only relevant, but important . . .
then Plaintiffs should pay for that additional discovery from this date forward.”); Chen-Oster v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 285 F.R.D. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Court noted that class action gender
discrimination case in which plaintiffs sought extensive discovery of ESI from defendants on the
issue of class certification created the risk of disproportionately burdensome and expensive
discovery demands on defendants. To mitigate this and ensure proportionality, the court
discussed the use of sampling and phased discovery.).
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precisely what the proportionality requirement in the Rules of Civil Procedure requires them to
do. So, if proportionality is achievable, and the tools to do so readily discernible, why have
lawyers, bar associations and even judges themselves continued to complain (as reflected by the
survey results reported at the beginning of this thesis) that judges are not monitoring and
managing cases to achieve proportionality? As the case analysis in Part Two demonstrates, it is
not because judges lack the tools to do so, or because there are not sufficient warning signs to
enable a judge to determine at an early phase of the litigation that there are problems with a case
that threaten to make discovery costs disproportionate. The answer must lie with judges
themselves—their attitudes towards their obligation to manage discovery proportionately, their
experience with civil discovery before becoming a judge, and the state of their knowledge of
how to go about monitoring and managing discovery proportionately. To test this hypothesis, I
administered a survey to United States district and magistrate judges designed to reveal their
attitudes toward discovery, their awareness of the requirement to manage discovery to achieve
proportionality, their approach to handling discovery disputes, the techniques they actually use
when doing so, the level of their experience with discovery in civil cases before becoming a
judge, and whether they had received training on how to manage discovery after becoming a
judge. As will be shown in Part Three, the results of these surveys suggest reasons why the
perception that judges are not fulfilling their obligation to manage discovery proportionately
persists.
Part Three
In June and July 2015, I administered a survey to United States district and magistrate
judges attending educational workshops sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, the research
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and educational branch of the United States Courts.212 The judges filled out the survey at the end
of an educational session about discovery, and participation was voluntary and anonymous. The
district judge workshop was for judges sitting in Fourth Circuit courts, which consists of the
states of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina. A total of
forty-two judges filled out the survey. The magistrate judge workshop was for judges sitting
throughout the United States. A total of sixty-eight judges filled out the survey. The surveys
were essentially the same, except that I asked district judges an additional question relevant only
to them—whether they handled discovery disputes in their cases themselves, or referred them to
magistrate judges. Also, based on the responses to the question directed to district judges
regarding their training, I refined the question regarding the training in discovery that magistrate
judges had received. I asked both district and magistrate judges about: (1) the frequency with
which they balanced the interests of the party requesting discovery against the burdens and
expenses to the party from whom discovery is requested (to assess their awareness of the
proportionality requirement); (2) their approach to handling discovery in civil cases (whether
they actively managed the discovery process, or waited until there was a dispute before
becoming involved); (3) the specific techniques they had used when resolving discovery disputes
(to determine which of the proportionality factors discussed in Part Two they had actually used);
(4) whether they had received training about how to monitor and manage discovery since
becoming a judge; and (5) their experience level with civil discovery prior to becoming a judge.
The results of the survey are discussed below.

“The Federal Judicial Center is the education and research agency for the federal courts.
Congress created the FJC in 1967 to promote improvements in judicial administration in the
courts of the United States.” Federal Judicial Center, available at www.fjc.gov (last visited Jan.
22, 2016)..
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When asked whether they refer discovery disputes to magistrate judges for resolution or
keep them for themselves, 19% of the district judges said they always keep them, 26% said they
always refer their discovery disputes to magistrate judges, and 55% said they sometimes keep
discovery disputes to resolve themselves, and sometimes refer them. Thus, 81% of the district
judges stated that they refer discovery disputes to magistrate judges for resolution (always or
sometimes) and only 19% always keep them for themselves. This is consistent with the results
of the case analysis in Section Two, where magistrate judges decided 67% of the reported cases
that discussed the proportionality factors when resolving discovery disputes, and district judges
decided only 28% of those cases.213 The fact that magistrate judges are deciding so many
discovery disputes may suggest that district judges are insufficiently experienced with the details
of discovery practice in civil cases to fully appreciate the proportionality requirement, or the
benefit of actively monitoring and managing cases to achieve it. It may also raise questions
about the optimal use of magistrate judges and whether they are becoming specialists in
discovery, while district judges are becoming more removed from it.
I asked both district and magistrate judges how likely they were when deciding a
discovery dispute (whether district judges kept it for themselves, or initially assigned it to a
magistrate judge, and became involved when ruling on objections to the magistrate judge’s
order) to balance the interests of the party requesting the discovery against the burdens and
expenses to the party from whom discovery is requested, and I gave them the following choices:
always, frequently, occasionally, seldom, and never. Of the district judges, 38% responded that
they always balanced need against cost, 48% said that they did so frequently, 13% said they did
so occasionally, and approximately 1% that they seldom did. For magistrate judges, 42% said
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they always balanced need against cost, 51% said they did so frequently, and 7% said they
seldom did. The possible implications of these responses are mixed. The “good news” is that
86% of the district judges and 93% of the magistrate judges were aware of the proportionality
requirement, as they always or frequently took it into consideration when resolving discovery
disputes. The “bad news” is that fewer than half of the judges responding always considered
proportionality factors in resolving discovery disputes, despite the fact that the Rules require
them to do so in all cases.
I asked the judges which of two choices best described their approach when the parties
asked them to rule on a discovery dispute—“I actively manage the discovery process in my
cases,” or “I become involved in the discovery process when the parties have a dispute that
results in the filing of a motion.” Of the district judges, 18% said they actively managed the
discovery process in their cases, while 82% said that they waited until a discovery dispute had
blossomed into a motion to become involved in the process. Of the magistrate judges, 39%
responded that they actively managed the discovery process in their cases, and 61% said that
they waited for a discovery motion to become involved. These responses seem especially telling,
as they indicate that both district and magistrate judges primarily view themselves as “dispute
resolvers” rather than “active managers” of the discovery process, with this view being far more
prevalent (82%) for district judges. Given the importance that the rulemakers have placed on
active judicial monitoring and management to achieve the objective of proportional discovery,214
the survey responses suggest that much more needs to be done to educate judges about the
benefits of active case management in achieving proportionality, and their obligation to do so.
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I asked both district and magistrate judges to identify which of the measures identified in
Part Two of this thesis as tools to achieve proportionality they had used when ruling on a
discovery dispute (themselves, or when ruling on objections to a magistrate judge’s discovery
ruling). Eighty-six percent of district judges and 93% of magistrate judges had encouraged or
ordered the parties to cooperate during discovery; 80% of district judges and 75% of magistrate
judges had imposed sanctions on parties for failure to properly fulfill discovery obligations; 76%
of district judges and 88% of magistrate judges had ordered that the scope of discovery be
narrowed; 69% of district judges and 79% of magistrate judges had ordered that discovery be
conducted in phases; 62% of district judges and 69% of magistrate judges had ordered cost
shifting from the producing party to the requesting party; 62% of district judges and 74% of
magistrate judges had adopted informal methods of resolving discovery disputes; 57% of the
district judges and 62% of magistrate judges had adopted discovery protocols, local rules, or
standing orders governing the discovery process; 55% of district judges and 41% of magistrate
judges had prohibited the parties from making boilerplate objections; 45% of district judges and
59% of magistrate judges had ordered the use of computer search methodology for discovery of
voluminous ESI; 36% of district judges and 60% of magistrate judges had ordered that discovery
be obtained from a less burdensome source; 33% of district judges and 63% of magistrate judges
had ordered sampling when discovery was sought from voluminous sources; 26% of district
judges and 53% of magistrate judges had issued non-waiver orders pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
502; 1% of district judges and 10% of magistrate judges had capped the amount of time a party
had to spend on discovery; and 1% of district judges and 18% of magistrate judges had ordered
the use of special masters or other neutrals to assist the parties during discovery.
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Several observations may be made from these responses. First, for most of the
proportionality techniques identified in Part Two of this thesis, more than 50% of both district
and magistrate judges had employed them, suggesting that regardless of whether they view
themselves as active managers of the discovery process or more passive dispute resolvers when
discovery motions are filed, judges widely are using many of the proportionality tools in
resolving discovery disputes. The flip side is that judges may not be sufficiently aware of many
useful proportionality techniques (or how best to use them), and this suggests that with education
and encouragement, greater use (and correspondingly more proportionality) may occur. The
responses also show that, with the exception of imposing sanctions and prohibiting boilerplate
objections, magistrate judges have more frequently used the proportionality techniques identified
in Part Two than district judges. Given the greater frequency with which magistrate judges have
to manage discovery and resolve discovery disputes, this is not surprising, but it does underscore
the need for greater training of district judges if the goal of proportional discovery is to be
achieved. Finally, the responses provide useful information to the Federal Judicial Center when
planning future educational programs on discovery for district and magistrate judges by
identifying the most useful techniques to focus on, as well as those which appear to be
underused.
I asked both district judges and magistrate judges about the training they had received
since becoming a judge regarding management of discovery in civil cases. Specifically, I asked
the district judges if they had received training about discovery from any source, whether the
FJC or another organization. Fifty-five percent responded that they had, while 45% said they
had not. Based on these responses, I refined the question before giving it to the magistrate
judges, whom I asked how many had received training from the FJC “regarding how to handle

92

civil discovery in a manner designed to achieve proportionality (balancing the need of the
requesting party against the cost and burden to the producing party), considering what is at stake
or at issue in the litigation.” Only 25% of the magistrate judges responded that they had received
such training, while 75% responded that they had not. The refined question about discovery
training that I posed to the magistrate judges provides more useful information than the less
specific question I asked the district judges, because it focused on education from the
organization principally charged with educating federal judges, as well as on the specific type of
training that could be expected to have the greatest effect on improving the management of
discovery to ensure proportionality. The responses from the district judges suggest that while
somewhat more than half have had some form of discovery training, nearly half have not. For
the magistrate judges, who more often have to deal with management of discovery, three quarters
had not received any training from the FJC regarding the proportionality requirement that the
rules impose on federal judges. These responses suggest that much more needs to be done with
judicial education if greater proportionality is to be achieved.
Finally, I asked both district and magistrate judges about the level of their experience
with discovery in civil cases before becoming a judge. Sixty-two percent of the district judges
and 66% of the magistrate judges reported “extensive” prior experience, 21% of district and 13%
of magistrate judges reported “some” prior experience, 12% of district judges and 13% of
magistrate judges reported “little” prior experience, and 5% of district judges and 6% of
magistrate judges reported no prior experience with discovery in civil cases before becoming a
judge. Overall, the vast majority of federal judges come to the court with at least some discovery
experience. Some have extensive experience. This is reassuring, as the intricacies of the
discovery rules and practice can be quite challenging for one with no prior exposure to them to
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learn (let alone master), and expecting new judges to be able to manage discovery effectively and
to achieve proportionality with no prior experience with this complicated area is asking a lot.
Nonetheless, the responses are a reminder that there are federal judges who come to the bench
without sufficient prior experience with the civil discovery process who would benefit from
educational programs designed to teach them the fundamentals of this process and, more
particularly, the importance of proportionality and the tools to achieve it.
The surveys conducted for this thesis provide useful insight about the attitudes of district
and magistrate judges regarding discovery in general, and the obligation to manage discovery to
ensure proportionality specifically. They were helpful in part because research failed to reveal
any similar surveys conducted of federal judges concerning their attitudes towards discovery,
and none of the surveys that were studied during the Duke Conference were directed at judges
themselves. That said, it must be acknowledged that a survey of only 110 federal judges cannot
be regarded as fully representative of the views and experiences of the more than 1200 district
and magistrate judges who constitute the federal trial judiciary.215 Nevertheless, a sampling of
nearly 10% of the federal judiciary can provide useful insight regarding their approach to
handling the discovery process in civil cases, their knowledge of the proportionality requirement,
their experience with the tools for achieving proportionality, and their level of familiarity with
discovery practice before becoming judges, at least for the purpose of beginning to understand
the reasons why it has been so difficult to persuade the federal trial judges to fully embrace the
notion of actively managing discovery to achieve proportionality. In the final section of this

There are 678 United States district judges. See “Federal judges and how they get appointed,”
in “How the Federal Courts Are Organized,” at www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf. There are 531
United States magistrate judges. See “A Guide to the Federal Magistrate Judge System,” at
www.fedbar.org .
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thesis, I will draw some conclusions from the research of the cases discussed in Part Two and the
survey of judges in Part Three, and offer some thoughts about further action that may be
advisable if the goal of achieving proportional discovery in civil cases is to be realized.
Part Four: Concluding Thoughts
As shown in Part One of this thesis, since the codification of the federal rules of civil
procedure in 1938, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has struggled with how to balance the
goals of making sure that litigants are able to obtain sufficient factual information about a case to
ensure that it is tried, settled or disposed of during summary judgment on its merits, without
imposing excessive burden or cost on the party from whom discovery is sought. The means that
the Committee adopted for achieving this delicate balance was the proportionality requirement,
first introduced into the rules in 1983. The Committee recognized at the inception of the
proportionality requirement that its success would depend on the willingness of federal judges to
“be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery overuse.”216 By 2000, when the
Committee amended the Rules again to reinforce the proportionality requirement, it
acknowledged that it had “been told repeatedly that courts have not implemented” the
proportionality limitations on overbroad discovery “with the vigor that was contemplated.”217
By 2010, following the Duke Conference, the Committee had concluded that rule changes alone
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1983) Advisory Committee Note. In 1984, the year following the
adoption of the proportionality requirement, Chief Justice Burger addressed the American Bar
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comments addressed discovery abuse as a significant cause of dissatisfaction with the state of
things in civil litigation. In discussing what changes were needed to turn things around, he
emphasized the need for discovery reform, stating “[w]hat this means is that, under the 1983
[civil] rule changes, judges must not remain aloof from what is going on in a case simply
because the parties have not presented themselves in the four walls of the courtroom to begin a
trial. The 1983 amendments require that judges take a more active role in overseeing the pretrial
proceedings.” Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, 70 A.B.A.J. 62, 65 (1984).
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would not succeed in making “meaningful improvements” in reducing the cost of discovery in
civil cases.218 Rather, the Committee recognized that the rules needed to be augmented by
education programs for judges to teach them to take more aggressive action to prevent overbroad
discovery.219 When the Committee proposed the 2015 amendments to the Civil Rules, it noted
that the success of the new rules would require three essential ingredients: cooperation,
proportionality and “sustained, active, hands-on judicial case management,” and it again
recognized the need for educating judges about the importance of active case management to
enable the new rules to succeed.220 And, as shown in the discussion at Part Two B.1,221 active
judicial case management is the most important of all the tools for achieving proportionality that
the cases analyzed in Part Two identify. It does not seem an exaggeration to say that without
active “hands on” judicial monitoring of the discovery process in all cases, and intervention to
manage more actively those cases that require it, the goal of achieving proportional discovery
never will be achieved—indeed thirty years of rulemaking efforts without apparent success
seems to have established this rather firmly.
It also seems clear based on the results of the case analysis in Part Two that, when judges
are willing to become involved in the discovery process, there are abundant tools available for
them to use to do so. And, the survey results show that most of these tools have enjoyed
widespread use by federal judges. If parties and judges can achieve proportional discovery
through the use of the tools the judges have at their disposal, then the widely held view that the
serial changes to the Rules to require proportionality have not been successful must in large part
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be attributed to the reluctance of the judges to embrace the notion that they must become active
in the management of the discovery process from its inception, and not passively wait until there
is a dispute, and then resolve only that particular dispute.
The survey results show that the attitudes of a substantial number of federal judges (82%
of district judges and 61% of magistrate judges) do not appear to be in sync with the expectation
of the Rules that they actively monitor and manage the discovery process to achieve
proportionality. What the survey does not show, however, is why so many judges feel this way,
and there are many possible explanations that may account for it.
It may be that some judges simply are opposed to the idea that they must be responsible
for management of the discovery process—are just philosophically opposed to doing so—and
will not find persuasive efforts to convince them otherwise. As one federal judge recently
expressed:
The job of a judge is to adjudicate—to decide disputes presented by litigants.
Performing that task fairly and efficiently of course involves management of the
docket; but management of discovery in individual cases ordinarily should be left
to the lawyers . . . . Absent a dispute for the judge to decide, the judge should trust
the lawyers and thus leave them free to manage their cases as they see fit, for
competent case management involves considerations that are beyond the ken of
the judge and outside the province of the rules by which a judge’s decisions
should be governed.222
As a practical matter, regardless of what the Rules may say, a federal judge who does not accept
the notion that he or she must actively manage the discovery process has considerable power to
simply decline to do so, and there is little that can be done about it.
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It may also be that some judges are not opposed to actively managing the discovery in
their cases, but simply are overwhelmed by the number of cases that they have and do not have
the time to do more than wait for a dispute, and then resolve it (themselves, or by referring it to a
magistrate judge or other judicial adjunct). It takes time to actively monitor the discovery
process. The judge must review the pleadings to see what is at issue in the case, confer with the
lawyers (either in person or telephonically), and then determine what discovery, and in what
sequence, is appropriate given what is at stake in the litigation. Where the lawsuit seeks only
money damages, and it is easy to predict the range of probable outcomes, this task can be done
quickly. But if the case is complex, involves many parties (who may not be inclined to
cooperate), or what is at stake is not monetary, deciding on an appropriate discovery plan at the
beginning of a case can be a difficult and time-consuming thing for a judge to do. Without
training on how to do so efficiently, and the proper tools to use, an overworked judge may
simply be unable to actively manage the process.
It may also be that some judges do not actively manage the discovery in their cases
because they have never received training to do so. Even judges with extensive experience in
civil discovery before they become judges do not necessarily appreciate the benefits of active
management of discovery. After all, as lawyers, they were used to managing the discovery in
their own cases, and may have practiced before judges who did not become involved in
discovery until there was a dispute. Without training to show them the benefits of active
management of discovery, and the tools for doing so, it is unrealistic to expect them to develop
that approach all on their own. And, as the survey reveals, nearly half of the district judges have
had no training at all since becoming a judge on how to manage the discovery process, and
nearly three-quarters of the magistrate judges—who handle most of the discovery disputes in
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federal court—have had no training at all in the proportionality requirement or how to manage
cases to achieve it.
Judges are appointed with varying experience as attorneys. The number of judges who
were prosecutors or defense counsel in criminal cases, or engaged in administrative law or
commercial law fields that did not give them experience in civil discovery before being
appointed will vary over time. There must be a consistent emphasis during judicial education
programs on the importance of achieving proportional discovery and the management tools
available to do so effectively. Waiting until the discovery rules have been amended to
implement judicial education about how best to monitor and manage discovery will be far less
effective in achieving the goal of proportionality than consistent education on this topic on an
ongoing basis with adjustments in emphasis depending on the experience mix of the judges being
trained.
There are several significant take-away points that this thesis raises. First, we really do
not know why it is that the judges have been reluctant to embrace the notion of actively
managing the civil discovery process, and this is a matter that is deserving of further exploration.
If active management is essential to achieving proportionality, and if the judges are resistant to
doing so, learning the reasons why seems essential to figuring out how to effectively address the
problem. Without further study, rulemakers will have to continue to amend the rules based on
anecdotal information, rather than specific data. If the goal of achieving proportionality is worth
the time and effort that has been spent on it (without yet achieving success), then surely it is
worth the additional time and expense to better understand the reasons why so many judges resist
active management of the discovery process. The Federal Judicial Center, which is the research
and education branch of the federal judiciary, should consider a comprehensive survey of federal
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judges to better learn about their attitudes and practices regarding discovery. Once judges have
been given the tools for achieving proportionality, they must be encouraged to use them, if only
because it is in their own self-interest to do so. Judges who actively monitor discovery in all
their cases, and who swiftly intervene to more directly manage cases where problems develop,
find that they have fewer discovery disputes overall, resolve those they do have more quickly,
and thereby have more time to devote to the substantive issues in their cases.
Second, there is a clear need for more extensive education of judges in how to effectively
manage discovery to achieve proportionality. The number of judges who have had little or no
training regarding proportionality is significant, and initial training for newly appointed judges
and continuing education for others seems essential to achieving the goal of proportionality.
Because there are so many effective tools to achieve proportional discovery, training that is
aimed at showing judges how to do so should be a priority. Moreover, it should not be relegated
to optional “break-out” sessions at judicial training programs, but instead should be required
training of sufficient length and detail to give judges a strong foundation in exactly how to
effectively manage discovery. Such education ideally should include practice using the
proportionality tools in realistic case settings that allow the judges to appreciate the warning
signals that discovery needs individualized management and to use the tools identified in Part
Two of this thesis. Further, developing sample orders, protocols, local rules and guidelines, as
well as written and recorded reference tools that judges may access on the website of the Federal
Judicial Center would allow judges to follow up live training sessions with additional
educational materials that would make it easier for them to master the skill of active management
of discovery.
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Finally, there are ninety-four federal judicial districts in the United States.223 Each court
reflects the experience, culture, and customs of the judges and lawyers of that district. Many
courts and judges likely have developed protocols, local rules, guidelines, and standard
procedures that have proven effective in the management of discovery in civil cases. A
systematic effort to identify what courts already have been doing that actually works should be
undertaken so that the successes of those courts may be shared with others, educational programs
may be tailored with this experience in mind, and materials may be archived for judges in other
locations to use.
If the changes to the Civil Rules adopted in 2015 are to finally break the cycle of
unsuccessful amendments to the rules to achieve proportionality, then the rule changes must be
simply the first of many steps taken to achieve the goal. More study of the reasons why judges
resist active management of discovery will suggest better ways to overcome this reluctance.
More extensive and practical education of judges as to how they may use the many tools to
achieve proportionality and recognize the warning signs that threaten to undermine it also will
ensure that judges know about the tools they need, how they may be employed most effectively,
and why it is in their self-interest to do so. And harvesting the experience of judges and courts
that already have figured out effective means to promote proportional discovery and making it
available for other judges and courts will go a long way towards ensuring that, a decade from
now, future members of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee are not again going through the
amendment process to say—once more—that judges need to ensure that discovery is
proportional. This thesis has shown that tools exist to achieve proportional discovery. What
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remains is to see whether the research, resources and educational effort needed to overcome
judicial reluctance to adopt active hands-on management of discovery can be mustered to get the
job done. Only if this occurs will it be possible to “stop the insanity.”
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